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ABSTRACT 
 
Due to lack of rigorous evaluations, there is limited evidence that homelessness 
prevention programs effectively reduce rates of homelessness and efficiently direct 
services where they can make the most difference. Effectiveness is the ability to reduce 
rates of homelessness among people who would otherwise experience it. Efficiency is the 
ability to direct services to those who would benefit most. Evidence of effectiveness 
requires a counterfactual – typically a comparison between a treatment group and a 
similar group that does not receive treatment. Evidence of efficiency necessitates 
development of a risk model and investigation of the levels of risk where services make 
the most difference. Investigations sometimes confound effectiveness and efficiency: 
evaluators might believe that services are effective when those services are imprecisely 
targeted.  
The current study examines effectiveness and efficiency for prevention programs 
in two sites. It develops risk models for homelessness using Cox proportional hazard 
models for 2,761 applicants for Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing in 
Alameda County and for 10,220 individual applicants for HomeBase prevention services 
in New York City. Further, it uses a regression discontinuity design for the sample in 
Alameda County to examine the effectiveness of services. The findings provide limited 
evidence that prevention programs can reduce entries into homelessness and stronger 
evidence that programs can work better by focusing on individuals and families at highest 
risk.  Triage models that exclude some applicants as too risky to serve are not supported 
by the data. The studies also contribute to the understanding of the causes of 
 iii 
homelessness, via the examination of risk factors in the two sites. The results suggest that 
structural issues are the driving forces of homelessness in two housing markets with 
limited access to affordable housing. Future research is necessary to obtain more precise 
estimates of prevention effects and to examine similarities and differences in findings 
across housing markets. Prevention programs might do better not only to provide 
immediate prevention services for individuals and families but also to combat the 
structural forces that lead to high rates of homelessness.    
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PREFACE  
 
This dissertation investigates the effectiveness and efficiency of homelessness 
prevention programs for at-risk populations. However, before I introduce the studies in 
the dissertation, I acknowledge an important contradiction between how homelessness 
prevention is done (practice) and how homelessness is understood (theory). 
Homelessness prevention is most often carried out at the individual level, and the 
investigations in this dissertation are no exception. The causes of homelessness, however, 
are not solely or even primarily individual-level phenomena (Burt, 1991; Shinn, 1992). 
Instead, much of the homelessness literature reports structural-level causes of 
homelessness (Apicello, 2010; Byrne, Munley, Fargo, Montgomery & Culhane, 2012, 
Shinn, 2007, 2010).  
Such a contradiction may seem like an insurmountable obstacle to prevention 
efforts, but structural factors that push people into homelessness often manifest at the 
individual level (c.f., Apicello, 2010). For example, income inequality and housing costs 
- which render housing unaffordable to many people at the bottom of the income 
distribution - may manifest at the individual level as the inability to pay rent. Further, 
effective prevention programs may help people avoid homelessness, even if programs 
offer services based on individual characteristics without addressing structural-level 
causes of homelessness. For example, a housing subsidy that makes rent affordable can 
counteract the structural causes of homelessness for an individual household. 
Accordingly, targeting risk factors at the individual level can effectively prevent 
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homelessness for certain people at risk, even if structural causes of homelessness remain 
in place.   
Targeting risk factors at the individual level creates limited change in the 
structural causes of homelessness, and these structural causes directly influence rates of 
homelessness (Burt, 1991; Koegel, Burnam & Baumohl, 1996; Rossi, 1994; Shinn, 2007; 
2010; Toro, 2007). In environments with minimal income inequality and strong safety 
nets for poor people, homelessness rates are much lower compared to environments with 
heightened income inequality and weaker safety nets (Toro, 2007). Such safety nets 
include policies that provide financial assistance to poor households or that aim to 
increase the availability of affordable housing. For example, in many European countries, 
family homelessness occurs at much lower rates than in the U.S., which has fewer 
protections for at-risk families (Toro, 2007).  
Although the targeting of structural factors that manifest at the individual level 
may seem like a temporary solution, it is a necessary step to keep people housed while 
prevention advocates fight for changes to structural-level causes of homelessness. Recent 
discussions explore homelessness prevention strategies that address both individual and 
structural factors associated with homelessness, but such strategies remain absent in 
practice (c.f., Apicello, 2010). The root causes of homelessness are likely to remain 
unaltered if prevention providers address only individual-level consequences of structural 
causes. However, homelessness prevention efforts can nonetheless alleviate much 
suffering, because many families and individuals experience homelessness while 
structural change occurs slowly.  
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Although structural-level causes of homelessness mostly determine rates of 
homelessness, individual-level risk factors reflect the types of people who become 
homeless. Thus, in the absence of structural-level change, one danger of targeting 
individual-level characteristics of homelessness is that prevention programs might target 
at-risk groups at the expense of exposing other groups to homelessness risk (e.g., giving 
scarce housing subsidies to people in shelter may lengthen the waiting list for other poor 
people) (McChesney, 1990; Sclar, 1990; Shinn, Baumohl, & Hopper, 2001). The most 
direct way to combat this threat would be to change the structural forces that direct 
people into homelessness. However, with limited structural-level changes, prevention 
programs should be routinely evaluated to accurately direct services to those most at risk 
for homelessness. 
To best combat homelessness, both structural and individual-level considerations 
should be included in homelessness prevention research (Apicello, 2010; Lee, Tyler, & 
Wright, 2010; O’Flaherty, 2004). To evaluate homelessness prevention that is carried out 
at the individual level in the absence of structural-level change, researchers should frame 
their studies in ecological context. Accordingly, investigations should include 
considerations of the characteristics of homeless people (individual level) and the root 
causes of high homelessness rates (structural level). For this reason, this dissertation 
includes a discussion of the structural forces contributing to homelessness before 
presenting individual level and ecological investigations of homelessness in subsequent 
chapters.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STRUCTURAL CAUSES OF HOMELESSNESS 
AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION 
 
Who is Considered Homeless? 
The current sub-section explores definitions of homelessness, because 
homelessness lacks a uniform definition. In the United States (U.S.), definitions tend to 
focus on the lack of a suitable residence. HUD’s definition includes four categories of 
homelessness: 
• People who are living in a place not meant for human habitation, in 
emergency shelter, in transitional housing, or are exiting an institution 
where they temporarily resided [or]… if they are exiting an institution 
where they resided for up to 90 days … and were in shelter or a place not 
meant for human habitation immediately prior to entering that institution. 
• People who are losing their primary nighttime residence, which may 
include a motel or hotel or a doubled up situation, within 14 days and lack 
resources or support networks to remain in housing...  
• Families with children or unaccompanied youth who are unstably housed 
and likely to continue in that state. This … category of homelessness … 
applies to families with children or unaccompanied youth who have not 
had a lease or ownership interest in a housing unit in the last 60 or more 
days, have had two or more moves in the last 60 days, and who are likely 
to continue to be unstably housed because of disability or multiple barriers 
to employment. 
• People who are fleeing or attempting to flee domestic violence, have no 
other residence, and lack the resources or support networks to obtain other 
permanent housing… (NAEH, 2012, p. 1).  
HUD does not provide as comprehensive a typology as that found in other developed 
countries.  
The European Union (E.U.) offers a more inclusive definition of homelessness 
that the authors describe as “home”-based. For example, the European Typology of 
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Homelessness and Housing Exclusion (ETHOS) includes multiple domains (i.e., 
physical, social, and legal) to generate a broad classification of homelessness into four 
broad categories: 
• rooflessness (without a shelter of any kind, sleeping rough) 
• houselessness (with a place to sleep but temporary in institutions or shelter) 
• living in insecure housing (threatened with severe exclusion due to insecure 
tenancies, eviction, domestic violence) 
• living in inadequate housing (in caravans on illegal campsites, in unfit housing, 
in extreme overcrowding) (FEANTSA, 2005). 
 
  Although the HUD definition restricts the category of persistent housing instability to 
families and youth, the ETHOS typology does not distinguish homeless families from homeless 
individuals. Further, the much broader ETHOS definition of homelessness includes not only 
those lacking a suitable residence (i.e., by the HUD definition), but also those living in 
overcrowded conditions. As the differences above demonstrate, definitions of sociopolitical 
concepts, such as homelessness, are not always straightforward and may depend on 
political agendas and research goals (Hopper, 1991). The E.U. plans to survey households 
about a range of homelessness indicators in future censuses. Researchers in the U.S. 
could expand databases, and thus research findings, by following a similar approach, 
albeit with a typology tailored to their goals.  
  Some definitions of homelessness are restricted because of challenges 
operationalizing the concept. For example, point-in-time (PIT) estimates offer a useful 
snapshot of homelessness, but they are problematic because the most vulnerable groups 
tend to be overrepresented; they are more likely to be homeless on any given night than 
those that experience brief or one-time encounters with homelessness (Shinn & Greer, 
2011). The 2013 Annual Housing Assessment Report to Congress (AHAR) reports a 
nationwide PIT estimate of 610,042 people on a single night in January 2013, 
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representing a decrease from 671,888 on a night in January 2007 (HUD, 2013a). In 2013, 
slightly less than two-thirds of homeless people were individuals (i.e., single adults or 
unaccompanied youth) and the remaining households were families (i.e., at least one 
adult and one child). The count of chronically homeless individuals (i.e., individuals with 
extended bouts of homelessness and disabilities) decreased by 25.2% from a single night 
in January 2007 to a single night in January 2013 (HUD, 2013a). Although such data 
provide a useful snapshot of homelessness, the numbers of people staying in shelters over 
the course of a year offer additional insight into the problem of homelessness. Annual 
shelter stays (i.e., stays in emergency shelter or transitional housing) are a second 
commonly reported measure of homelessness. For example, in 2012, 1.49 million people 
stayed in shelter for at least one night, representing a 0.9% decrease from 2011. In other 
words, from October 1, 2011 to September 30, 2012, one in 209 people in the U.S. stayed 
in a homeless shelter (HUD 2013b). Measuring shelter stays provides useful information 
about shelter entry rates, but fails to include homeless people who stay on the streets.  
  Some people are more likely to become homeless than others, and characteristics 
of homeless groups differ. In 2011, African Americans were overrepresented among both 
families and individuals who experienced homelessness, but especially among families. 
Moreover, people experiencing homelessness had higher rates of disabilities than the U.S. 
population overall (HUD, 2013b). Other studies found that baby boomers have 
maintained highest risk status for single adult homelessness over the last three decades, 
meaning that the average age of single adults experiencing homelessness has risen over 
that period, whereas a similar aging trend is not apparent for families (Culhane et al., 
2013). Further, among childless adults, longer durations of homelessness were associated 
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with older age and arrest history (Caton et al., 2005). In summary, empirical evidence 
indicates differences across homeless groups, and researchers should continuously strive 
to uncover the reasons for these differences.  
What Causes Homelessness? 
Historically, two broad classes of theories frame the causes of homelessness. The 
first class posits that structural-level factors cause homelessness. Such factors include 
policy, social exclusion, and other macro- and community-level domains. The second 
class posits that individual factors cause homelessness. Some individual factors, such as 
mental illness, might originate at this level, but other individual-level risk factors for 
homelessness, such as higher risk for racial minorities, are manifestations of structural 
factors at the individual level (c.f., Koegel, Burnam & Baumohl, 1996). However, even 
supposed individual factors like mental illness - that hinge on society’s definitions of the 
factor - are heavily influenced by policy decisions. Such decisions include the level of 
disability benefits and the requirements for obtaining and maintaining them.  
Until the 1990s, structural and individual-level theories were viewed as 
competing, however, they address two different research questions (Koegel, Burnam & 
Baumohl, 1996). Structural-level theories address the question of homelessness rates: 
why do so many people become homeless? Alternatively, individual-level theories 
address the question of who becomes homeless: why do certain people become 
homeless? Currently, the most accepted theory of homelessness causes is a combination 
of structural and individual factors (Apicello, 2010; Lee, Tyler, & Wright, 2010). 
Sociologists discuss the causes of homelessness with a similar macro/micro framework 
(for review see Lee et al., 2010), with O’Flaherty (2004) suggesting homelessness is “a 
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conjunction of unfortunate circumstances (p.1).” Some studies take an explicitly 
ecological view, suggesting that the structural and individual factors are interrelated and 
that individual factors tend to be manifestations of structural-level forces (Nooe & 
Patterson, 2010).  
The current section discusses the structural factors associated with homelessness: 
policy (Shinn, 2007), social exclusion (Shinn, 2010), and community-level domains 
(Byrne, Munley, Fargo, Montgomery & Culhane, 2012). Structural factors originate from 
sources beyond households. Examples of the origins of structural factors include 
economic systems, governments, institutions, schools, and neighborhoods. Below I 
present each of the structural factors in detail.  
Policy. In the current subsection, I discuss universal and targeted policies, 
sometimes across countries, to illustrate how policy type relates to homelessness. 
Universal policy applies to everyone – it defines services that are available to the whole 
population and are a responsibility of the public sector. Targeted policy, in contrast, 
assumes that the market addresses the needs of most of the population and focuses on 
particular at-risk groups. With targeted approaches, the adequacy of funds allocated to 
services differs across locales (Czischke & Gruis, 2007). The links between economic 
inequality and universal social policy are well documented (McFate, Lawson, & Wilson, 
1995; Smeeding, 2005), and some homelessness researchers argue that developed 
countries with less generous universal policies and greater inequality have higher 
homelessness rates than developed countries with more generous universal social policies 
(Shinn, 2007, 2010; Toro, 2007). Although social expenditures may reduce rates of 
homelessness by keeping people out of poverty, cross-country comparisons are difficult 
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due to the diversity of social and financial structures. An exhaustive analysis of social 
policy across developed countries is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, I 
highlight policies most relevant to homelessness. 
Universal social policy can adopt a variety of forms, such as housing or welfare-
related policy. Housing policy can be further divided into tax benefits and direct 
assistance. United States housing policy favors homeownership via tax benefits and 
offers many fewer resources to low-income households. For example, in 2008, 
homeowner tax benefits (e.g., mortgage interest deductions) totaled more than $171 
billion, whereas benefits for direct housing assistance totaled just over $40 billion. 
Further, households earning more than $100,000 annually receive the vast majority of the 
tax breaks (Schwartz, 2010). Policy that is intended to reduce poverty rates (e.g., social 
welfare policy) also impacts homelessness rates. Shinn (2007, 2010) argues that 
developed countries with progressive tax policy and transfer programs that reduce 
inequality experience much lower rates of homelessness than countries without such 
policy. Further, the types of policy are directly linked to rates of specific types of 
homelessness. For example in countries, such as the United States, and secondarily the 
U.K. that have high financial inequality and limited income support for families, rates of 
homelessness for families exceed rates in other developed countries.  
Rossi (1994) offers additional insight into the causes of homelessness, especially 
focusing on family homelessness. First, Rossi argues that family homelessness originated 
in the 1970s and 1980s from high unemployment, an economic recession, and lower 
levels of financial assistance than had previously been offered. He further posits that 
homeless people failed to realize the so-called “trickle-down” effects of Reagan era 
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economic policy. Further, welfare assistance is conditioned on employment, which is 
often difficult for young single mothers to maintain (Blank, 2010; Shinn, 2010). Some 
sociologists in the U.K. argue that welfare-to-work policies do not align with single 
parents’ desires or capabilities (Rafferty & Wiggan, 2011). Based on the results of two 
quarters of the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey in 2006 and 2007, Rafferty and 
Wiggan (2011) suggest that the primary reported reason that single parents do not want 
employment is that they are taking care of their children. Further barriers to employment 
include poor health, disability, and care for older dependent children. Rafferty and 
Wiggan (2011) argue that welfare-to-work regulations are government impositions of 
idealized parenthood and acceptable citizen behavior.  
On the other hand, some sociologists argue that prevention programs should assist 
homeless people to find a place within the labor market. Fallis (2010) argues that 
progressive housing policy should focus on targeted homelessness prevention rather than 
on universal social housing policies, especially for countries with limited funding for 
housing programs. Supported by a thorough history of social housing in Canada, Fallis 
(2010) suggests that the economic conditions of today are quite different from the times 
of Keynesian economics, when social housing programs fit well with traditional families. 
Those at risk for homelessness were not required to have the same amount of mobility 
necessary to participate in today’s economy. Instead of universal housing policy, the 
author recommends renovating social housing and targeting services to homeless people 
to give them access to the labor market – although he offers no consideration for the 
diminished economic benefits that homeless people might realize within this market. 
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To avoid homelessness, people require stable housing. To respond to the need for 
stable housing, the United States opts for targeted approaches instead of universal 
homelessness policy. However, targeting specific groups for an intervention is 
complicated. A central danger with targeted rather than universal prevention strategies 
includes shifting resources to at-risk groups at the expense of removing resources from a 
group that avoided homelessness because of them.  Thus a game of “musical chairs” 
(McChesney, 1990; Sclar, 1990) or “queue jumping” (Shinn, Baumohl, & Hopper, 2001) 
threatens effective homelessness prevention. In terms of homelessness prevention, 
researchers should search for at-risk groups continually, because the face of homelessness 
(i.e., groups most at risk of experiencing homelessness) changes over time (Hopper, 
1991; Israel, Toro, & Oullette, 2010; Shinn, Baumohl, & Hopper, 2001).  
Social Exclusion. If policy makers truly represent the citizens who voted for 
them, then policy should reflect underlying social and cultural beliefs. Based on 
psychological theory (Levine & Levine, 1970), Shinn (2007) argues that a structural 
framing of homelessness is found in societies that favor government intervention and 
more generous welfare programs. Alternatively, the dominant culture in the United States 
reflects a stronger emphasis on individual responsibility than in continental Europe and 
exhibits a preference for individual explanations of homelessness.  
Some sociologists in the U.K. take similar stances by arguing that New Labour 
legislators attempted to link homelessness with employment strategies (Dobson & 
Mcneill, 2011). The authors suggest that personal responsibility was a key component of 
New Labour legislation and conclude that work programs were intended to create 
“empowered and responsible citizens” (p. 586), when, in fact, the programs perpetuate 
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the social exclusion of marginalized groups. Further sentiments of neoliberal 
reproduction arise in discussions of homelessness prevention programs that are framed 
with economic rather than social understandings (c.f., Willse, 2010). Dobson and 
McNeill (2011) argue that researchers should critically examine prevention programs to 
consider how much they benefit targeted recipients compared to how much programs 
reinforce existing power structures. Other studies concur (Willse, 2010). 
Several researchers in North America advance the discussion of the relationship 
between homelessness and the labor market by considering employed homeless people 
(Shier, Jones, & Graham, 2012). The authors interviewed 61 employed homeless people 
from 2008 to 2009 in Calgary, Canada, to examine the government preference for “work-
first” models (Iverson & Armstrong, 2006, in Shier et al., 2012). Such models are 
intended to increase individual responsibility to participate in the labor market. Shier et 
al. (2012) conclude that multiple factors associated with the labor market fail to prevent 
homelessness and may contribute to increasing rates. Many respondents reported 
insufficient work, inconsistent pay, weak relationships with employers, job loss resulting 
in loss of employment-based housing, and undesirable employment.  
A similar study in the U.K. includes interviews with 30 mostly unemployed 
homeless individuals to understand their perceptions of employment seeking (McNeill, 
2010). The authors find four pathways to employment: work focus (i.e., felt they were job 
ready), deferred focus (i.e., desired training before seeking employment), uncertain focus 
(i.e., felt unsure or uninterested in employment), and resettlement focus (i.e., focused on 
reestablishing stable housing rather than employment). The authors conclude that a one-
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size-fits-all program tied to employment requirements fails to respond to the various 
pathways people experiencing homelessness desire.  
Additional studies find more compassion in the public opinion of homelessness in 
countries with more progressive welfare policy (i.e., continental Europe) than in countries 
with less generous welfare policy (i.e., English-speaking countries) (Toro, 2007).  
Further, in societies with heterogeneous populations, a status sometimes called “ethnic 
fractionalization” tends to favor policy that benefits the status quo and does not transfer 
wealth to minorities (Alesina & Glaser, 2004; Shinn, 2007). Alternatively, more 
homogenous societies often have generous welfare policies, including policies for those 
who experience homelessness. It seems that the powerful are less willing to assist 
homeless people if they consider homeless persons to be different from themselves.   
Discrimination: Racism 1and Stigma2. Racism is one of the most conspicuous 
forms of discrimination that affects who becomes homeless. The U.S. consistently reports 
higher rates of homelessness for people belonging to minority groups than to the majority 
group (HUD, 2013a, 2013b). For example, in the U.S., 36% of the overall population 
identified as non-white compared to 60% of sheltered homeless people (HUD, 2012b). 
                                                
1 Here, the term racism focuses on differences in treatment of racial minorities. I intend 
the term “racism” to acknowledge differences in power and opportunity for groups with 
diverse levels of social capital. I borrow Blumer’s (1958) and Bobo’s (1999) framework 
of racial prejudice as group position to define racism including: “1) …a feeling of 
superiority on the part of dominant group members, 2) …a belief that the subordinate 
group is intrinsically different and alien, 3) …a sense of proprietary claim over certain 
rights, statuses, and resources, and 4) …a perception of threat from members of a 
subordinate group who harbor a for a greater share of dominant group members’ 
prerogatives” p. 449 
2 Here, I use Link and Phelan’s (2001) definition that stigma is “…the convergence of 
interrelated components…stigma exists when elements of labeling, stereotyping, 
separation, status loss, and discrimination occur together in a power situation that allows 
them” p. 377. 
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However, overrepresentation of minorities among the homeless is not a unique 
phenomenon to the United States.  In the U.K., 14% of the overall population belongs to 
a non-white ethnic minority (U.K. Census, 2013) compared to 35% of homeless people 
(i.e., owed a homelessness duty3) (Office of Deputy Prime Minister, 2013).  
Discrimination, in the form of stigma, also affects people with disabilities, such as 
mental illness and substance abuse. For example according to the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration, in 2011, national rates of mental illness (13.3%), 
substance abuse (6.1%), or both (2.2%) (SAMSHA, 2013, US Census, 2011) were much 
lower than rates of sheltered persons who had severe mental illness (26.2%) or of 
sheltered adults who experienced chronic substance abuse (34.7%) (Paquette, 2011). For 
chronically homeless individuals, the rates are even higher, with 30% experiencing 
mental health problems and approximately 50% with co-occurring substance abuse 
(Paquette, 2011). For homeless individuals with co-occurring substance abuse and mental 
illness, providing housing without additional requirements has been shown to keep 
people housed longer and at higher rates compared to housing with additional 
requirements (Tsemberis et al., 2004). 
The evidence for direct connections between some disabilities and homelessness 
appears to be weak. For example, Jencks (1995) argues that the crack epidemic was 
responsible for increases in homelessness. If crack use were a direct cause of 
homelessness, investigators should have seen an explosion of homelessness followed by a 
                                                
3 A homeless duty is the determination that a local housing authority has a “duty to 
house” a homeless person. Eligibility requires evidence that the person is 1) 
unintentionally homeless, 2) connected to the local area, 3) eligible for public funds 
(immigration status), and 4) considered to be in priority need of services (definition 
differs by nation).  
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plateau and recession in rates  as crack use rose and fell. However, cocaine use, including 
crack use, has declined dramatically by almost 42% from 2006 to 2011 (NIDA, 2012), 
while rates of homelessness declined by only 6.3% from 2007 to 2012 (HUD, 2012b). 
Although the time periods are slightly different comparing cocaine use and homelessness, 
there is little evidence for a strong relationship.  
Family composition. Single parenthood has been blamed for increasing 
homelessness rates. Jencks (1995) argues that homelessness rates increased from 1969 to 
1989 when “unskilled women not only married less but continued to have children 
[which] pushed more of them into the streets.” (p. 58). Other studies support the idea of 
relationships between homelessness and a cultural shift towards declining marriage rates 
(Burt, 1991). Although family structure is related to poverty, among poor households, no 
studies suggest that two-parent households offer additional protection from homelessness 
(c.f., Shinn et al., 2013). Actual increases in homelessness rates for single mothers are 
more likely caused by the drastic restructuring of social policy, leading to decreased 
assistance for single mothers (Rossi, 1994). As described at the beginning of this chapter, 
rates of family homelessness are much lower in countries that have strong social welfare 
nets and generous family policies compared to higher rates in countries that lack such 
policies. Further, families that receive housing subsidies tend to stay housed (Khadduri, 
2008; Wood et al., 2008).  
Structural Causes at the Community-Level. Structural determinants of 
homelessness exist at multiple levels. Investigations of homelessness at the community 
level tend to include at least some of the following community-level correlates of 
homelessness: housing markets, economic conditions, demographic composition, safety 
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net, climate, and transience (Byrne et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2003). When affordable 
housing is out of reach, the poorest households can be at heightened risk for homeless. 
For example, multiple studies find positive associations between the cost of rent and rates 
of homelessness at the community level (Early & Olsen, 2002; Lee et al., 2003). It is 
important to note that estimating homelessness rates is challenging. However, rental cost 
was still positively associated with homelessness under different model assumptions, for 
example that shelter counts were accurate and street counts undercounted homelessness 
by one-fifth and one-tenth. Further, Early & Olsen (2002) were unable to find many other 
significant predictors of homelessness, most likely due to inaccurate counts of street 
homelessness.  
Local revitalization efforts can lead to displacement of already homeless and 
extremely poor people. For example, Jencks (1995) argues that the destruction of skid 
rows led to higher homelessness rates. Jencks’ argument is especially relevant for people 
with mental illnesses and suggests that displacement from deinstitutionalization did not 
lead to homelessness until cheap housing and skid rows largely disappeared.  
Local economic conditions have been shown to influence homelessness rates in 
previous studies, with higher unemployment and poverty rates associated with higher 
rates of homelessness (Burt, 1991; Quigley et al., 2002). Demographic characteristics of 
communities provide, perhaps, the least consistent associations with rates of 
homelessness. In terms of individual traits, African Americans and female-headed 
households are overrepresented groups that experience homelessness. However, at the 
community-level findings are inconsistent in terms of demographic characteristics (Byrne 
et al., 2012). As with all investigations that span multiple levels of analysis, researchers 
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should be aware of the temptation of the ecological fallacy when associations from one 
level are assumed to be true at other levels.  
Local social safety nets can have negative associations with homelessness rates. 
Further, as the safety net gets wider and more substantial, protection becomes stronger 
(Byrne et al., 2012). For example, Honig and Filer (1993) used HUD estimates of 
homelessness rates across 50 metropolitan areas in 1984. They found that welfare 
programs, such as higher rates of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, were 
associated with lower rates of homelessness, although the rate of SSI receipt was 
associated with higher homelessness rates (Honig & Filer, 1993).  
Climate is another community-level factor that some investigations hypothesize is 
associated with homelessness. Studies find that lower rates of precipitation and higher 
temperatures contribute to higher rates of homelessness, and higher rates of people 
staying in unsheltered locations (Byrne et al., 2012). Finally, some studies have 
investigated associations of rates of transience with rates of homelessness. For example, 
Lee et al., (2003) found increased homelessness rates in areas that experienced population 
growth. The authors argue that this finding may be due to higher competition in the 
housing market when increasing demand (i.e., higher in-migration) raised prices and left 
those unable to compete at risk for homelessness.  
Despite the evidence for structural causes of homelessness, most homeless 
prevention efforts are framed at the individual level. Current frameworks include 
interventions for individual-level manifestations of structural-risk factor domains 
including demographics, human capital, housing conditions, disability (including 
criminal justice involvement), interpersonal discord, childhood experiences, and shelter 
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history (Apicello, 2010; Shinn et al., 2013). Instead of addressing policy that permits 
greater housing affordability, homelessness prevention normally targets the individual 
characteristics of those who experience homelessness. Even though such prevention 
practices undeniably fail to address the structural causes of homelessness, such efforts are 
vital to assist people who are becoming homeless currently. I explore this assertion 
further in the next section. 
Homelessness Prevention  
Homelessness prevention research builds on broader literatures on prevention in 
public health and epidemiology.  Prevention reduces problematic outcomes by 
minimizing risk factors that lead to higher rates of unwanted outcomes and by 
maximizing protective factors that lead to lower rates (Coie et al., 1993; Mrazek & 
Haggerty, 1994). Exposure to risk factors can have additive effects or worse, 
multiplicative effects, on dysfunctional outcomes. Alternatively, protective factors can be 
combined to mitigate the harmful effects of risk factors (Coie et al., 1993).  
Typologies of prevention that originated in public health have been extended to 
homelessness prevention (Culhane et al., 2011; Shinn, Baumohl, & Hopper, 2001). At 
least two overlapping prevention typologies have been used to frame homelessness 
research. The first describes the precision of strategies for targeting prevention programs 
and includes three categories: universal, selected, and indicated prevention (Mrazek & 
Haggerty, 1994; Shinn et al., 2001). Universal prevention gives an entire population 
access to a prevention strategy. For example, a society can implement a right to housing 
that would guarantee affordable housing to the lowest-income population. Universal 
prevention can be cost effective if the prevention strategy is cheap. However, for 
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expensive strategies, universal prevention of relatively uncommon conditions would be 
more costly than targeting at-risk groups or individuals.  
The remaining two categories of prevention, selected and indicated, are types of 
targeted prevention (Mrazek & Haggerty, 1994; Shinn et al., 2001). In selected 
prevention, membership in a high-risk group makes one eligible for prevention. Targeting 
money to an at-risk community would qualify as selected prevention. For example, 
neighborhood revitalization programs target particular neighborhoods even though a 
range of income levels exists across households in any particular neighborhood. Indicated 
prevention is targeted prevention for households that are screened for high-risk 
characteristics. Instead of targeting larger groups that may contain households at risk of a 
particular unwanted outcome, indicated prevention targets specific at-risk households. 
Because of the specificity of indicated prevention, this category would be the most cost-
effective choice for expensive interventions to alleviate relatively rare conditions.  
Other researchers frame their discussion of prevention with a second widely used 
public-health based typology:  primary prevention, where individuals are prevented from 
an unwanted outcome (i.e., reducing incidence); secondary prevention, where individuals 
are assisted quickly to reduce the duration of an unwanted outcome (i.e., reducing 
prevalence); and tertiary prevention, where prevention efforts attempt to reduce 
secondary side-effects of an established problem (Culhane et al., 2011). Although the 
categories of primary and secondary prevention are straightforward descriptors of 
homelessness prevention strategies, tertiary prevention is not as clearly applicable to such 
strategies. In public health, tertiary prevention can refer to preventing the debilitating 
effects of a condition. In homelessness studies, multiple researchers equate tertiary 
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prevention with chronic homelessness prevention (Burt et al., 2007; Culhane et al., 2011). 
However, prevention strategies that reduce rates of chronic homelessness often address 
the unwanted outcome (i.e., homelessness), rather than addressing secondary unwanted 
side effects of homelessness. Tertiary prevention may be a better descriptor for 
interventions such as soup kitchens or health clinics, where housing is not provided, but 
the side effects of homelessness (e.g., hunger, health problems) are addressed.  
Culhane et al. (2011) argue that the timing of prevention strategies should be as 
close as possible to the shelter door, or the point between primary and secondary 
prevention when individuals are about to lose or have just lost their homes. The authors 
claim that such a system should avoid the creation of specialized services in favor of 
maximizing support from mainstream agencies. They further argue that such strategies 
would maximize cost-effectiveness and prevention effectiveness. The authors posit that 
those threatened with losing their homes would avoid the high costs of shelter entry, and 
those at risk for long-term homelessness would avoid expensive long-term shelter costs. 
Culhane et al. (2011) also suggest that a gradient of prevention services, which offers 
people the least expensive services for their level of homelessness risk (and reserves 
more expensive services for those who are not helped by less expensive options), would 
be superior to existing systems of care. However, the authors do not discuss specific 
approaches to targeting homelessness-prevention strategies to those in greatest need of 
services.  
As suggested earlier, to combat homelessness, prevention efforts should address 
structural and individual-level risk factors for homelessness. Apicello (2010) proposed 
the population and high-risk framework that offers such a multi-level approach. This 
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framework suggests that population-level interventions, such as increased affordable 
housing, can be combined with strategies targeted at high-risk households. The combined 
approach would effectively reduce homelessness without the “queue-jumping” problems 
associated with traditional targeted strategies. Unfortunately, the population and high-risk 
approach is limited by the lack of population-based interventions. In the absence of such 
programs, homelessness prevention and homelessness causes will remain somewhat 
mismatched. Current homelessness prevention is carried out with a focus on the 
individual level, and investigations of current prevention programs are vital to understand 
how well such programs work to reduce homelessness rates for people at highest risk of 
losing their homes. With the majority of homeless people experiencing brief but 
expensive shelter stays (Culhane, Metraux, & Byrne, 2011), a focus on community-based 
homelessness prevention may be a cost-effective strategy to combat homelessness.  
Effectiveness and Efficiency. Successful homelessness prevention must be both 
effective and efficient (Burt et al., 2007). Effectiveness is the ability of a program to 
reduce rates of homelessness among people who would otherwise experience it. 
Efficiency is the ability of a targeting model to direct services to those who would benefit 
most from such services. Sometimes investigations confound these ideas: evaluators 
might believe that services are effective when those services are going to individuals who 
were not at risk to begin with. Evidence of effectiveness requires some reasonable 
counterfactual – typically a comparison between a treatment group and a similar group 
that does not receive treatment. Limited evaluations and their lack of sophistication lead 
to sparse evidence for effectiveness (Apicello, 2010; Greer & Shinn, in progress; Shinn et 
al., 2001). Nevertheless, some evaluations show evidence of effectiveness in community-
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based homelessness prevention (Cragg & O’Flaherty, 1999; Culhane et al., 2002; 
Khadduri, 2008; Messeri, O’Flaherty, & Goodman, 2011; Padgett et al., 2011; Pearson et 
al., 2009; Perlman & Parvensky, 2006; Rolston, Geyer, & Locke, 2013; Sadowski et al., 
2009; Stretch & Kreuger, 1993; Tsai et al., 2011; Tsemberis et al., 2004; Wong et al., 
1997; Wood et al., 2008).  
Few studies investigate efficiency explicitly. Although some scholars investigated 
the risk factors associated with homelessness (Bassuk et al., 2010; Crane & Warnes, 
2000; Early, 1998; 2004; Edgar, 2006; Gubits et al., 2009; Nolan et al., 2005; O’Connell 
et al., 2008; Wong et al., 1997; Zlotnick et al., 1999), most risk factor investigations fail 
to combine risk factors into models and to assess how accurately the models target those 
most at risk. Exceptions were a New York City investigation of family homelessness 
(Shinn et al., 1998), a New York City investigation of HomeBase prevention services 
(Shinn et al., 2013) and a Hennepin County, MN investigation (Barnett et al., 2011). 
Efficiency investigations are needed to show who benefits from particular prevention 
strategies. Such models are just as vital in understanding homelessness prevention as 
models that examine intervention effectiveness. 
Dissertation Research Questions 
This dissertation addresses the dearth of evidence for effective and efficient 
homelessness prevention programs by empirically examining two community-based 
prevention programs - one in New York City (NYC), NY, and one in Alameda County, 
CA. I bring to these studies the perspective that research on effectiveness and efficiency 
can assist prevention programs to improve services and decrease rates of homelessness. 
Although structural causes of homelessness must be addressed to successfully prevent 
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homelessness overall (Apicello, 2010; Shinn, 2010), prevention programs that assist at-
risk households individually can reduce rates of homelessness and mitigate its harmful 
effects on physical and mental well-being of people who experience it. With the 
perspective of community-based homelessness prevention in mind, I ask the following 
questions in three papers: 
 
1. Efficiency: Which individual applicants for homelessness prevention services in 
New York City are at highest risk of entering shelter?  How does an empirical 
model compare with a similar model derived for families?   
2. Efficiency:  What applicants for homelessness prevention services in Alameda 
County are at highest risk for different manifestations of homelessness? How do 
models compare with those in New York City? 
3. Effectiveness:  Does a community-based homelessness prevention program 
(Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-housing Program [HPRP]) in Alameda 
County effectively reduce rates of homelessness for applicants who received 
services? 
 
The current chapter now introduces the context of these homelessness prevention studies: 
NYC’s HomeBase Program and Alameda County’s EveryOne Home Program.  
Research Context. NYC’s HomeBase and Alameda County’s EveryOne Home 
programs are the major providers of community-based homelessness prevention services 
in their respective geographies. The HomeBase program serves New York City with 
homelessness prevention and has participated in empirical research to examine its 
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effectiveness (Messeri, O’Flaherty, & Goodman, 2011; Rolston, Geyer, & Locke, 2013) 
and to improve the efficiency of its targeting strategies for families (Shinn et al., 2013). 
HomeBase administrators have requested a more efficient targeting model than the one in 
use for childless adults. The EveryOne Home program serves Alameda County, CA, with 
homelessness prevention and seeks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its 
targeting models.  
Homelessness prevention in Alameda County and prevention services in NYC 
differ in at least two ways. The first difference is variation in homelessness service 
systems. The service system in Alameda County is less integrated than that of NYC. 
Further, New York City has a legal right to shelter; Alameda County does not. The 
second difference is climactic. The annual range of temperatures in Alameda County is 
much smaller than in New York. Chapter 4 includes an in-depth discussion of additional 
differences between Alameda County and NYC.  
Across sites, people applied for homelessness prevention services, and their 
subsequent shelter entry was tracked in administrative records by the Homelessness 
Management Information System (HMIS) in Alameda County and records of the 
Department of Homeless Services (DHS) in New York City. Additionally, in Alameda 
County, if applicants reapplied for prevention services, staff recorded where individuals 
stayed since their last application. Alameda intake records indicated whether or not a 
household was unstable (e.g., overcrowded, with arrears), in imminent danger of losing 
housing (e.g., threatened with eviction), or literally homeless. Thus shelter entry is not the 
only potential indicator of homelessness in Alameda County.  
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Additional measures of homelessness are recorded only for a biased sample, 
namely those initial applicants for services who return to providers for additional 
services.  Homelessness may also be underestimated to a greater extent than in New York 
City because not all shelters participate in HMIS and people might be more likely to stay 
on the street in a warm climate. From a cost standpoint, such an analysis is useful because 
we can predict homelessness as it impacts the Alameda County homeless service system 
(i.e., service providers and participating shelters). However, from a social justice 
standpoint, a more comprehensive assessment is necessary to more accurately investigate 
factors that lead to overall homelessness. Such data are not collected currently.  
Organization of the Dissertation 
The remainder of the dissertation investigates homelessness prevention programs 
and ends with policy recommendations based on the outcomes. Chapter 2 uses survival 
analysis to model factors that contribute to hazard of shelter entry after adult applicants 
without children applied for homelessness prevention services in NYC. Chapter 2 
contributes to the literature by developing a screening model for individuals and then 
comparing the efficiency to a model developed for families in the same city. Chapter 3 
uses survival analysis to model factors that contribute to hazard of shelter entry after 
applicants applied for homelessness prevention services in Alameda County, CA. 
Further, this paper expands outcomes to include additional definitions of homelessness: 
shelter entry, imminently losing housing, and unstable housing. Additionally, I compare 
both the substantive model and its efficiency to results in NYC. Chapter 3 contributes to 
the literature by expanding the definition of homelessness to incorporate an ecological 
framework. Further, the paper compares risk models for Alameda County, CA, with NYC 
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to determine the extent to which rick factors are consistent across these disparate 
contexts. Chapter 4 uses a regression discontinuity approach to investigate the 
effectiveness of the Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-housing Program (HPRP) in 
reducing rates of homelessness in Alameda County, CA. Chapter 4 contributes to the 
literature because it is the first evaluation of HPRP that includes a counterfactual, and the 
chapter uses one of the first regression discontinuity (RD) designs to investigate 
homelessness. Further, the design includes two discontinuities - one for people at high 
and low risk - allowing researchers to examine differential effects of prevention at 
different risk levels. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings across studies and 
describes implications for community-based homelessness prevention. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
PREVENTING HOMELESSNESS FOR INDIVIDUALS IN NEW YORK CITY: 
TARGETING SERVICES TO THOSE MOST LIKELY TO BENEFIT  
 
Introduction 
Nationwide in 2012, 1.48 million people stayed in shelter at least one night, and 
almost two-thirds were individuals not part of family units (HUD, 2013b). Shelter stays 
are expensive (Culhane et al., 2011a; Spellman et al., 2010) and associated with a variety 
of adverse outcomes (Grunberg & Eagle, 1990). Compared to shelter stays, accurately 
targeted and effective community-based prevention programs might be cheaper and less 
emotionally taxing (Culhane et al., 2011b). The current study develops a model to predict 
shelter entry for adult applicants for the HomeBase homelessness prevention program in 
New York City (NYC). The goal of this study is to assist service providers to target 
prevention services to applicants who can benefit most. Although the approach is similar 
to one used previously for family applicants, literature suggests that individuals and 
families have different risk profiles associated with shelter entry.    
Here, families are defined as at least one adult and one child, and individuals are 
defined as adults without children. Individuals form the largest group of people 
experiencing homelessness nationwide but not in New York City (NYC) (HUD, 2012b). 
Of all homeless people staying in shelter or transitional housing in NYC on a single night 
in January 2013 (HUD, 2013b), less than 35% were individuals.  This is lower than the 
national rate of individuals in shelter both because of the high cost of housing in New 
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York City (which is particularly problematic for families) and because of the city’s legal 
right to shelter (which means that families who might put up with extremely poor housing 
conditions in other jurisdictions overwhelmingly enter shelter as an alternative in New 
York). Individuals, on the other hand, more often become homeless on the streets. In the 
city, couples without children can be sheltered together but are considered part of the 
individual adult system. Such couples are included here, and I use the term individuals to 
describe the population. 
In response to the vital need to improve targeting of prevention services, this 
paper answers the following five questions: What is the pattern of subsequent shelter 
entry for individual applicants for prevention services?  Which risk factors contribute to 
shelter entry for this group?  How do risk factors for shelter use vary between families 
and individual applicants? Are some applicants at such high risk that prevention services 
make little difference? How does the efficiency for an empirical model for individuals 
compare with decisions made by service providers in the absence of such a model?  
How Do Families and Individuals Differ? 
 Homelessness plagues both families and individuals, but characteristics differ 
across these groups. When comparing NYC to the United States (US) as a whole, the 
trends in homelessness rates for individuals in shelter appear to be headed in opposite 
directions. From 2007 to 2012, homelessness rates for individuals in shelter fell by 6.5% 
nationally (HUD, 2013b), compared to a 15.2% increase in NYC (HUD, 2013a). 
Although the rates of national homelessness are based on Homelessness Management 
Information Systems (HMIS) data covering an entire year and the NYC rates are based 
on Point-in-time (PIT) estimates for a single night, the opposite trends are noteworthy.   
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Risk profiles from the national data illustrate how families and individuals 
experiencing homelessness differ. For example, in 2011, African Americans were 
overrepresented in both groups, but especially among families. Additionally, single 
homeless people had higher rates of disabilities (HUD, 2012a). Other studies found that 
baby boomers have maintained highest risk status for single adult homelessness, leading 
to an increase in average age for this group over the last three decades, whereas a similar 
aging trend is not evident for families (Culhane et al., 2013). Further, among individuals, 
longer durations of homelessness were associated with older age and arrest history (Caton 
et al., 2005).  
Why Do Families and Individuals Differ? 
A description of the structural forces that shape homelessness suggests why rates 
of homelessness for families and individuals differ. Such descriptions illuminate how 
rates of homelessness may shift with changes in economic and social policy. For 
example, during the second half of the twentieth century, contemporary homelessness 
emerged first for individuals and then for families in step with shifts in political, social, 
and economic forces. Rossi (1994) attributed longitudinal shifts in the characteristics of 
homeless people to macro-level changes. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, older 
single men living in urban “skid rows” exemplified homelessness. Contrastingly, family 
homelessness appeared in the 1970s and early 1980s with greater unemployment, an 
economic recession, and less financial assistance.  
In spite of an economic boom in the late 1980s, the wealthiest Americans’ 
financial gains failed to “trickle down” to the poorest households (Rossi, 1994). In the 
1990s, many states restructured welfare programs to require employment, a challenge for 
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single mothers (Shinn, 2010). Discrimination across multiple domains  (e.g., housing, 
employment, imprisonment) is another structural force that likely leads to greater rates of 
homelessness for minorities (Shinn, 2010). These macro-level factors relate strongly to 
the growing proportions of people experiencing homelessness throughout the second half 
of the twentieth century.  Additionally, the financial costs of housing further differentiate 
families and individuals. Families require larger units than individuals; young families 
are at particular risk because of the high costs of childcare. For individuals, financial 
burdens may be lower, but disabilities and more restrictions on public assistance than 
those for families impede housing affordability. Across at-risk groups, but especially for 
families with children, a lack of affordable housing pushes financially constrained 
households into homelessness (Shinn & Weitzman, 1994).  
Disabilities, such as mental illness and substance abuse are factors that are often 
included in discussions of homelessness. In 2011, national rates of mental illness 
(13.3%), substance abuse (6.1%), or both (2.2%) (NSDUH, 2013, US Census, 2011) were 
much lower than rates of sheltered persons who had a severe mental illness (26.2%) or of 
sheltered adults who experienced chronic substance abuse (34.7%) (Paquette, 2011). For 
chronically homeless individuals, the rates are even higher - 30% experienced mental 
health problems and approximately 50% exhibited co-occurring substance abuse 
(Paquette, 2011). Further, the exclusion of substance abuse as a disability to qualify for 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) likely exacerbated already constrained financial 
situations, especially for single adults (Burt, 2001). Alternatively, individuals with mental 
illness might alternate repeatedly between shelters, jails, and substance or mental health 
facilities to compensate for a lack of stable housing with supportive services, a 
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phenomenon that is sometimes called the “institutional circuit” (Hopper et al., 1997, p. 
659). 
Finally, single parenthood has been blamed for increasing homelessness rates. 
Jencks (1995) argues that homelessness rates increased from 1969 to 1989 when 
“unskilled women not only married less but continued to have children [which] pushed 
more of them into the streets.” (p. 58). Although family structure is related to poverty, 
among poor households, to my knowledge studies do not suggest that two-parent 
households offer additional protection from homelessness (c.f., Shinn et al., 2013). 
Actual increases in homelessness rates for single mothers are more likely due to the 
drastic restructuring of social policy, leading to decreased assistance for single mothers 
(Rossi, 1994).  
In sum, the characteristics of families and individuals who experience 
homelessness tend to differ in response to economic, social, and political structures. 
Structural barriers, however, cannot explain all causes of homelessness. Rather, the 
complex causes of homelessness likely originate from both structural and individual 
levels (Lee et al., 2010). For example, potential individual-level risk factors for 
homelessness include the death of a spouse, a mental disorder, and experiences of 
domestic violence (Bassuk et al., 2001). Ending homelessness requires making housing 
more affordable. In the absence of such structural changes, people continue to lose 
homes. Provision of rapid, effective targeted homelessness prevention to those at risk can 
reduce the immediate financial and emotional costs of shelter entry.  
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Risk Factors and Model Efficiency 
Many studies assess risk factors for homelessness, but for purposes of prevention, 
investigations should also assess how efficiently a collection of risks organized into a 
targeting model can select people at risk for homelessness (Burt et al., 2007; Shinn & 
Greer, 2011). To test the efficiency of a model, evaluations should examine hit rates and 
false-alarm rates at various levels of assessed risk (Shinn et al., 1998; Shinn et al., 2013; 
Swets, 1996). The hit rate is defined as the proportion correctly predicted to enter shelter 
among all shelter entrants. The false-alarm rate is defined as the proportion of households 
incorrectly predicted to enter shelter among all people who avoid shelter entry.4 Notably, 
the denominators of these rates differ. For the hit rate, the denominator includes all cases 
where the outcome occurs. For the false-alarm rate, the denominator includes all cases 
where the outcome is absent. In the case of a continuous risk model, service providers 
can provide services to all who exceed some cutoff of risk, with that cutoff suggesting a 
particular trade-off between hit rates and false-alarm rates (Shinn et al., 2013). 
Models predicting homelessness tend to have low hit rates, unless researchers and 
policy makers are willing to tolerate high false-alarm rates. For example, in a nationally 
representative sample, Hudson and Vissing correctly predicted 2.6% of the people who 
self reported an experience of homelessness at a false-alarm rate of 0.1%. The authors 
chose such a low cutoff for risk because the false alarm rate applied to the entire 
population of the nation. This study used demographic, socio-economic, and mental 
illness predictors, but the authors ignored differences between families and individuals.  
                                                
4 In the language of epidemiology, the hit rate is synonymous with sensitivity. The false-
alarm rate is one minus specificity, where specificity is the proportion correctly predicted 
to avoid the unwanted outcome among all who avoid it. 
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Other investigations modeled homelessness risk for families (Barnett et al., 2011; 
Shinn et al., 1998; Shinn et al., 2013) and chose higher false alarm rates because they 
applied to more select populations. With a targeting model, Shinn et al. (1998) correctly 
identified 66% of shelter entrants (i.e., the hit rate) with a false-alarm rate of only 10% of 
families receiving public assistance in NYC. Families receiving public assistance are a 
much more select group than the national population, nonetheless, offering services to 
10% of the public assistance caseload at the time of the study would have meant that over 
80% of services would have gone to people who would avoid shelter without them (Shinn 
et al., 2001). In an even more select sample of 2,602 homeless families, half of whom 
participated in the rapid exit program in Hennepin County, Barnett et al. (2011) 
attempted to predict shelter re-entry and found a hit rate of 48% of re-entrants with a 
false-alarm rate of 23%, or those who were predicted to re-enter shelter but who did not.  
A recent investigation examined the efficiency of targeting models for families 
who applied to the HomeBase prevention program in New York City. Shinn et al. (2013) 
used Cox proportional hazards modeling to identify risk factors for shelter entry over 
three years among 11,105 families who applied for HomeBase services. The authors 
calculated that if HomeBase continued to serve the same percentage of applicants 
(66.5%) but selected them according to the targeting model rather than worker 
judgments, they would improve the hit rate to 90.4% from 71.6% among applicants who 
entered shelter, at the expense of a false-alarm rate of 65.7% among applicants who 
remained housed. However, targeting remains difficult: even in the highest decile of risk, 
only 44% of families who failed to receive services entered shelter.  
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To my knowledge, only one study considers the efficiency of predictive models 
for any population subgroups other than families. Greenberg et al., 2006 created a model 
that predicted rates of subsequent homelessness for previously homeless veterans. They 
found that for the lowest-risk group, 2.9% of veterans experienced subsequent 
homelessness, whereas 27.6% of the highest-risk group experienced homelessness again. 
The authors found that better housing outcomes originated from 1) entering the program 
without a status of homeless, 2) receiving treatment in a substance abuse or psychiatric 
program rather than a medical program, and 3) having greater income or access to 
financial assistance. The authors do not report false-alarm rates.  
The current study adds to the literature by developing a risk model for subsequent 
shelter entry for individuals who applied for prevention services in NYC. This 
investigation then compares the risk factors for individuals and families. Additionally, the 
current study examines the efficiency of the targeting models for the two groups and 
whether some adults are at too high risk to benefit from prevention efforts. The 
investigation permits targeting of prevention services to individuals who will benefit 
most. 
Methods 
Participants were 10,220 individuals who applied for NYC’s HomeBase 
prevention services from September 28, 2004, to December 29, 2010. Overall, the sample 
contained mostly females (61%), African Americans (56%), and high school graduates 
(59%). Further, the majority was middle-aged (median age = 46), employed (66%), 
without a veteran status (97%), unmarried (88%), without a history of a mental health 
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diagnosis (79%), and without a history of substance abuse (82%). Service providers 
determined the eligibility of applicants for services.   
Variables   
 At application, intake workers surveyed participants about the following domains: 
demographic variables, human capital, housing conditions, disability, interpersonal 
discord, childhood experiences, and shelter history. (Variables used in analysis are shown 
in Table 1.) The New York City Department of Homeless Services (DHS) merged these 
survey results with administrative records of applicants’ previous interactions with the 
DHS shelter system, and the date of any subsequent shelter entry. 
Analyses 
 The current study develops a risk model predicting subsequent shelter entry.  It 
uses survival analysis (Cox proportional hazards) to model time to any subsequent shelter 
entry in days, from risk factors among individual applicants for prevention services. The 
model includes a dichotomous variable indicating whether the individual avoided shelter 
throughout the follow-up period. Use of survival analysis, rather than logistic regression 
was important because individuals had different follow-up periods; additionally survival 
analysis models time to shelter entry and not simply whether shelter entry occurred.  I 
impute 50 data sets for missing data with STATA, including auxiliary variables 
according to the literature (Graham, et al., 2007; Sinharay et al., 2001)5.  
I compare results to those found in a previous investigation of families that 
applied for HomeBase services (Shinn et al., 2013) with respect to both risk factors and 
rates of shelter entry among applicants who were judged eligible for services (and 
                                                
5 See appendix for additional notes about multiple imputation. 
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presumably received them) and those judged ineligible by level of risk. Next, I develop a 
short screening model to streamline service delivery. Finally, as described in more detail 
below, I examine the efficiency of the model.   
Following methods developed in Shinn et al. (2013, the current chapter employs 
three survival analysis techniques: 1) Kaplan-Meier survival curves, 2) Hazard Functions, 
and 3) Cox proportional hazards models. First, Kaplan-Meier survival curves show the 
momentary probability that an individual has not experienced homelessness as a function 
of time, beginning at the point of application for prevention services. Kaplan-Meier 
estimates are computed as the product of the proportion of individuals avoiding an 
outcome at a particular interval and the proportion of individuals avoiding the outcome at 
all previous intervals (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2005). By definition, the cumulative 
proportion can only stay the same or decrease over time. Kaplan-Meier curves are useful 
because they provide the length of time avoiding outcomes. Steep slopes represent rapid 
occurrences of the outcome, whereas gradual slopes signal longer times avoiding the 
outcome (Luke, 1993).  
While survival curves provide the cumulative proportion avoiding an outcome, 
hazard curves show the instantaneous rate of experiencing an outcome at each time, given 
that the outcome has not already occurred. The hazard function is slightly more complex 
than the survival function, and can be represented with the following formula:  ℎ! = 2𝑞!/𝑤!(1+ 𝑝!),             (1) 
where ℎ! is the instantaneous hazard rate, 𝑞! is the proportion experiencing the outcome 
at some time point, 𝑤! is the width of the time interval, and 𝑝! is the proportion avoiding 
the outcome, with the denominator for both proportions being the people who are still 
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eligible to experience the outcome for the first time (Luke, 1993). The hazard function is 
useful, because it shows the times for which risk for the outcome is highest and lowest, 
and how that risk changes over time.  
Cox proportional hazards models are a popular semi-parametric technique to 
model the effects of multiple covariates that may shift the hazard function up or down. 
The model assumes that the ratio of hazards across levels of the covariate is constant (i.e., 
proportional) across time (Cox, 1972). The Cox proportional hazards model thus shows 
which risk factors increase or decrease the risk (i.e., hazard rate) for individuals over 
time. The current chapter uses Cox proportional hazards to model risk for experiencing 
shelter entry after households in applied for HomeBase services. Following the full 
model, I create a short screening model to address two issues with the full model. First, 
the full model is likely overfitted, and second, the challenges of collecting such a large 
number of variables led to large amounts of missing data. I create a parsimonious 
screening model by eliminating non-significant variables via backwards regression and 
then verifying that each remained non-significant when added back to the final model. I 
also check that each predictor remained significant in the robustness tests in two random 
subsamples.  
Next, the current chapter examines the efficiency of these models – their hit rates 
relative to their false alarm rates. Hit rates and false alarm rates are related to type I and 
type II errors. Figure 2.1 shows the relationship of model predictions with actual 
experiences of the outcome of interest. Box A refers to hits, or correct model predictions 
of outcomes that actually occur. Type I errors (box B) refer to false alarms, or model 
predictions of outcomes that do not actually occur. Type II errors (box C) refer to misses 
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or failures of the model to predict outcomes that occur. Box D refers to correct model 
predictions that an outcome will not actually occur. The hit rate from Figure 2.1 would 
be: 𝑨𝑨!𝑪. The false alarm rate from Figure 2.1 would be: 𝑩𝑩!𝑫.  It is important to note that 
the denominators of hit rates and false alarm rates are different; for the hit rate, it is all 
cases where the outcome actually occurs, and for the false-alarm rate, it is all the cases 
where the outcome is absent.  
Figure 2.1. Contingency Table for Hit Rates and False alarm Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the current chapter, the hit rate is the proportion correctly predicted to enter 
shelter among all who actually experience the outcome. The false-alarm rate is the 
proportion of households incorrectly predicted to enter shelter among all people who 
avoid it. Any model will generate multiple hit rates and false alarm rates depending on 
what cutoff is used for risk. When individuals with any risk factors are predicted to 
experience the outcome the hit rate will be high, but so will the false alarm rate. When 
only individuals with many risk factors are predicted to experience the outcome, both hit 
rates and false alarm rates will be lower.  
A receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) is a graph of hit rates against 
corresponding false alarm rates for all possible cutoffs of risk scores. Computing an ROC 
curve requires a dichotomous outcome (e.g., shelter entry vs. not). In the present study 
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ROC curves were generated using logistic regression, where predicted scores from a 
logistic regression were averaged across the fifty imputed data sets to create an average 
risk score for shelter entry.  
ROC curves can be used to compare competing models with the goal of selecting 
the model with the highest hit rates as compared to the lowest false-alarm rates (Swets, 
1996) across levels of risk (see Figure 2.2). Where the model does no better than 
randomly placing households into positive or negative classifications, the ROC curve 
would fall directly on the 45-degree reference line in Figure 2.2. To the extent that the 
model predicts an outcome perfectly, the hit rate would be 1 and the false alarm rate 
would be 0. Thus the curve would be pulled to the upper left corner (see ideal curve 
below in Figure 2.2). Most ROC curves fall between these extremes, and ROC curves 
from different models can be compared to select the model that most closely approaches 
the upper left corner. The ROC curve can also be used to select cutoffs in risk scores to 
make people eligible for services. Because hit rates increase with increasing false alarm 
rates along the ROC curve, policy makers can decide how many false alarms they can 
tolerate in order to obtain as many correct hits as possible.  
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Figure 2.2. Example of ROC Curves 
 
Results 
Table 2.1 contains descriptive statistics, hazard ratios, and confidence intervals 
for the model predicting shelter entry for individuals. Only 5.4% of those who applied for 
services entered shelter subsequently (over the next 2 to 8 years), and the majority of 
people who entered shelter did so within one year of applying for services. The hazard 
ratio and 95% confidence interval for each predictor is adjusted for all other variables in 
the model. Hazard ratios represent the amount by which the rate of shelter entry is 
multiplied for people who exhibit the characteristic (or for continuous variables, the 
multiple for each additional increment such as year of age), adjusted for other variables.  
Among demographic variables, only age made a reliable contribution to the 
model. Controlling for the other variables in the model, younger applicants were more 
likely to enter shelter. None of the human-capital variables contributed reliably to the full 
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model. For housing conditions, rent arrears and threats of eviction contributed to the 
model. Increasing arrears were associated with significantly higher rates of shelter entry. 
Findings for threats of eviction were mixed. Individuals who were threatened with verbal 
eviction entered shelter at a rate that was more than two times the rate of those who were 
not threatened verbally. On the other hand, those who faced a legal eviction action 
entered shelter at slightly less than two-thirds the rate of those who did not indicate a 
legal eviction threat.6  
For disability/criminal justice variables, none of the variables in the categories of 
interpersonal discord or childhood experiences contributed reliably to the full model.  For 
shelter-history variables, a self-reported shelter application in the last three months 
increased hazard for shelter entry by over 2.5 times. Individuals who were reintegrating 
into the community from an institution entered shelter at more than 1.3 times the rate of 
those who were not reintegrating. Individuals who had a previous shelter stay were over 
18.5 times more likely to enter shelter than those without a previous shelter stay. 
Some of these results were unexpected, so I explore them further. I start with the 
seemingly protective effect of legal eviction threats. If service providers are likely to 
target a factor, such as legal eviction, that increases risk in the absence of services, and 
they are able to counteract such risk, the net effect of the factor might be zero or even 
protective. Under these circumstances the factor might appear to confer risk for those 
who did not receive services and protection for those who received services. In statistical 
terms one would say that services interacted with the factor in predicting shelter entry. To 
determine whether this was the case for eviction or any other predictor I looked 
                                                
6 I reexamined the different types of eviction for families and did not find the same 
apparent protective effect of legal eviction as I found for individuals.  
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systematically for such statistical interactions showing differential associations of 
variables with shelter entry for individuals who were and were not eligible for services. 
After finding no significant interactions, I investigated the relationship between legal 
eviction and subsequent shelter entry for all ineligible individuals.  The association, while 
still protective, approached zero (HR = .92).  
The strongest support for the idea that legal eviction might appear protective only 
because of an association with services comes from the subset of ineligible individuals 
who lived outside of the community district (n = 907). For these applicants, who could 
not receive services, legal eviction was a risk factor for subsequent shelter entry (HR = 
1.34). For this reason, I exclude legal eviction as a protective factor for homelessness in 
the screening model, even though it serves to reduce the predictive power of the model in 
a combined sample of those who did and did not receive services. Although it is not 
surprising that previous shelter stays are associated with subsequent shelter entry, the 
magnitude of the effect (HR= 18.6) is impressive. I explore this relationship further in the 
next section. 
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7 To create a robust model, I estimated it initially in two independent random 
subsamples of 50% of the data. (For each, I imputed fifty datasets based only on the 
information in the subsample.) The resulting models were substantially similar to the 
complete model with the exception that mental illness failed to be a reliable predictor in 
either subsample. Accordingly, mental illness is omitted from the screening survey. 
 
Table 2.1. Descriptive Data, Adjusted Hazard Ratios, & Confidence Intervals for Predictors 
of Shelter Entry in Cox Regression (n = 10,220) Continuous Variables in Italics 
 
Predictora No Shelter  
 % or 
mean 
n = 9,663 
Shelter  
% or 
mean 
n = 557 
Hazard 
Ratio 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Demographics     
Male 38.1 45.5 0.979 0.735-1.303 
African Americana 55.1 69.8 0.859 0.544-1.356 
Hispanic 37.5 22.5 0.684 0.418-1.117 
English Speaker 71.6 95.0 1.506 0.865-2.623 
Age  44.6 41.6 0.977*** 0.967-0.987 
Married/partner 11.5 21.1 1.013 0.726-1.413 
Veteran 2.8 4.3 1.077 0.529-2.192 
Human Capital     
High school /GED 59.0 57.7 0.889 0.690-1.145 
Currently employed 55.1 71.7 1.075 0.715-1.618 
Currently receiving public 
assistance 56.8 62.0 1.630 0.969-2.742 
Lost benefits in past year 10.4 17.5 1.075 0.636-1.814 
Housing Conditions     
Name on lease 45.7 65.3 0.627 0.343-1.146 
Arrearsc  $1600 $3429 1.018*** 1.008-1.027 
Overcrowding or Discord b 19.1 14.3 0.866 0.586-1.280 
Doubled up 26.8 19.8 1.459 0.944-2.255 
Verbal Eviction threat 13.2 29.6 2.085*** 1.353-3.212 
Legal Eviction action 32.5 28.4 0.648* 0.456-0.921 
Rent > 50% income 38.0 47.6 1.211 0.809-1.811 
Unsafe conditions 6.4 10.1 1.072 0.721-1.593 
Level of disrepair  4.2 3.2 0.613 0.260-1.442 
Moves in past year  0.7 0.6 0.797 0.629-1.010 
Currently receiving subsidy  4.9 5.5 1.194 0.629-2.264 
Disability/Criminal Justice     
Chronic health/hospitalization  53.6 44.7 0.969 0.605-1.553 
Mental illness/ hospitalization 21.6 18.4 0.6157 0.386-0.981 
Substance problem/treatment 17.2 25.0 1.195 0.464-3.077 
Criminal justice involvementd 21.1 31.0 0.885 0.581-1.348 
Interpersonal Discord     
Domestic violencee 15.9 13.8 1.003 0.602-1.672 
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Notes. 
a Omitted Race/ethnicity category is All Other 
b Overcrowding and discord were combined in the original data set 
c Truncated at $15,000, HR and CI in units of $100 
d Any family member ever incarcerated or respondent on probation or parole 
e Experienced domestic violence or violence in past year 
f ACS investigation in past year, open case, child ever in foster care, currently in 
protective care  
g Discord rating (9-point scale) with landlord, leaseholder, or household members 
h Count of 5 experiences in childhood: family receipt of public assistance, abuse, shelter, 
foster care, 4 or more residential moves 
 * = p ≤ .05 ** = p ≤ .01 *** = p ≤ .001 
 
Previous Shelter Stays 
As shown in Table 1, 70.6% of HomeBase applicants who later entered shelter 
had been in New York City shelters previously, compared to just 7.2% of those who 
avoided shelter.  To explore this relationship further, I graphed the proportions of 
individuals with and without prior shelter histories who stayed out of shelter over time 
(see Figure 2.3). Among HomeBase applicants without previous shelter stays, the 
probability of avoiding shelter entry remained above .95 throughout the study period. For 
those with previous shelter stays, however, the probability of avoiding shelter entry was 
just over .5 by about four years after the HomeBase application.8 No other variable was 
                                                
8 These survival probabilities are lower than for the full sample, because the average 
person in the full sample was not observed as long. The survival graph for individuals 
with previous shelter stays levels off after just over four years because no further entries 
were observed among the small group of such individuals who applied for HomeBase 
early enough to have such a long follow-up observation period. 
Protective services involvementf 4.3 6.7 0.890 0.386-2.052 
Discord ratingg  2.1 1.6 0.962 0.819-1.130 
Childhood Experiences     
Adversity indexh  0.5 0.6 1.058 0.870-1.286 
Shelter History (self report)     
Shelter history as adult 23.4 75.0 1.400 0.872-2.250 
Shelter app. last 3 mos.  3.3 17.1 2.517*** 1.758-3.604 
Reintegrating into community 10.4 27.5 1.372* 1.058-1.780 
   By Administrative Data     
Previous shelter stay 7.2 70.6 18.561*** 12.620-27.297 
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nearly so powerful a predictor of shelter entry, either taken alone or controlling for other 
variables.9  
Figure 2.3. Cumulative Survival Estimates for Shelter Entry 
 
 
Risk Model for Individuals 
After looking at risk factors for homelessness, I investigated whether households 
could be at such high risk that prevention would make little difference in subsequent rates 
of shelter entry. This does not appear to be the case. Figure 2.4 shows the proportion of 
individuals who entered shelter by decile of risk (calculated by averaging predicted 
                                                
9 I further investigated separate models for individuals with and without a previous 
shelter stay. Individuals with a previous shelter stay (n = 1084) had similar predictors of 
subsequent shelter entry to the overall model, with all significant variables remaining in 
the model (in the same direction of risk) except currently receiving public assistance and 
mental illness/hospitalization. Individuals without a previous shelter stay (n = 9125), 
however, had only three significant predictors of subsequent shelter entry: age, arrears, 
and verbal eviction threat. A combined model, stratified by shelter entry, produced 
similar substantive results to the full model with the exception that mental 
illness/hospitalization fell out of the stratified model. 
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scores across fifty imputed data sets) separately for adults judged eligible or ineligible for 
HomeBase services, and Figure 2.5 shows the parallel model for families, from a 
previous investigation (Shinn et al., 2013). Ignoring eligibility, the probability of shelter 
entry was similar for families (Fs) and individuals (Is) at the lowest decile of risk (Fs = 
1% and Is = 0%) and at the highest (Fs = 37% and Is = 38%).  
The risk models for individuals and families differed at intermediate risk deciles. 
The proportion of individuals who entered shelter remained close to 0 until the ninth 
decile, when it rose rapidly. By way of contrast, risk rose more smoothly for families, 
with a tenth or more of families entering shelter at each decile in the top half of the risk 
distribution. Services seemed most helpful for individuals in the tenth decile of risk, 
although they also appeared to make some difference for those in the ninth decile, as 
indexed by the difference in shelter entry rates between those judged eligible and 
ineligible for services. Services did not appear to matter for individuals or families in risk 
deciles who rarely entered shelter, most likely because there was little risk to avert. On 
the other hand, the fact that legal eviction was associated with staying out of shelter 
might be taken as effectiveness of eviction prevention services. Similar to families, the 
majority of individuals avoid shelter entry, even in the highest risk decile.  
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Figure 2.4. Rate of Shelter Entry for Deciles of Risk by Eligibility Status for Individuals 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Rate of Shelter Entry for Deciles of Risk by Eligibility Status for Families 
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Screening Model 
As described in the methods section, I created a short screening model by 
eliminating non-significant variables via backwards regression and then verifying that 
each remained non-significant when added back to the final model. I added public 
assistance to the model at this stage, because it became significant after other correlated 
variables were removed. In line with the body of forecasting literature (Dawes, 1979; 
Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Dana & Dawes, 2004) and the previous study of homeless 
families (Shinn et al., 2013), I assigned from one to six points based on the comparative 
magnitudes of regression coefficients for dichotomous predictors and shelter entry rates 
at specific intervals for continuous predictors.  
Table 2.2 introduces the screening model. Individuals could score from 0 to 16 
points across seven variables, with increasing scores associated with increased risk of 
shelter entry. Previous shelter stays are worth the most points. Actual scores (averaged 
across 50 imputed data sets) ranged from 0 to 14.1 points with the median score of 1.4. 
Receiving a score of three or more placed individuals in the ninth decile of risk, and a 
score of seven or more placed individuals in the highest decile of risk.  Thus almost all 
applicants with a previous shelter stay (six points) were in the top decile of risk, and few 
applicants without such a stay reached the top decile. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
49 
Table 2.2. Screening Model Predicting Individuals Who Should Receive HomeBase 
Services 
 
1 point 
• Reintegrating into the community 
• Currently receiving public assistance 
 
2 points 
• Verbal eviction threat 
• Reports applying for shelter in last 3 months 
 
6 points 
• Administrative record of previous shelter stay 
 
Age 
• 29-32 years: 1 point 
• 28 or under: 2 points 
 
Arrears 
• $5000-$8000: 1 point 
• $8000 or greater: 2 points 
 
Model efficiency. Figure 2.6 shows the efficiency of the resulting models. I plotted 
the hit rates compared to false-alarm rates for the full model and the screening model. In 
addition to the tradeoff in efficiency for the full and screening models, Figure 2.6 shows 
point estimates for one-variable models based on whether administrative records showed 
that the respondent had been in shelter previously (previous shelter) and whether the 
intake worker deemed the respondent eligible for services (worker).  
Several conclusions about the efficiency of various models are evident in figure 
2.6. First, the full model is only slightly more efficient than the screening model at high 
levels of risk, but departs at lower levels. Second, the Previous Shelter Model exhibited a 
high hit rate (70.6%) compared to a low false-alarm rate (7.2%), and was far more 
efficient than worker decisions during the period under study (hit rate of 50.7% vs. false 
alarm rate of 43.4%) among those deemed eligible for services. This comparison 
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excluded those who were ineligible because they were outside of the service area or 
refused services (n = 1,137). Additionally, service providers would serve fewer applicants 
with the Previous Shelter Model (10.7% of applicants for Previous Shelter model; 39.1% 
currently). Holding the proportion of applicants served constant at 39.1%, the Screening 
Model would increase the current hit rate to over 90% and misses would fall by over 
85%. 
Figure 2.6. ROC Curves for Model Efficiency 
 
As a global comparison of efficiency, I investigated the Area Under the Curve 
(AUC) values for full and Screening Models across families and individuals. If the 
estimated curve fell along the 50% reference line (i.e., the diagonal line in figure 2.6), the 
resulting AUC would be .50, whereas a perfect model would capture all of the area (i.e., 
the AUC value would be 1.00). I compared the resulting AUC estimates, after using Stata 
software to estimate nonparametric ROC curves with bootstrapping for inference. The 
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full model for individuals had an AUC of .92 (CI .91 - .94), and the Screening Model had 
an AUC of .90 (CI .88 - .91). The full model for families had an AUC of .76 (CI .74 - 
.77), and the Screening Model had an AUC of .74 (CI .73 - .75). Accordingly, the 
Screening Model for individuals is substantially more efficient than the model for 
families. 
As a further test of the robustness of the Screening Model, I examined how well it 
predicted shelter entry for people deemed ineligible for services for different reasons. By 
targeting 39.1% of applicants (the same proportion offered services currently) with the 
screening model, I identified 87% of the 295 applicants who were deemed ineligible for 
services but who entered shelter subsequently. This includes 89% of 46 individuals 
thought to have insufficient housing risk, 88% of 161 deemed eligible for a more 
appropriate program, 97% of 29 who did not comply with the intake process, 100% of 19 
who refused services, and 89% of 27 who lived outside of the community district.  
Comparisons to Families 
I compared the model developed here with a model previously developed for 
families applying to HomeBase. Although the dates of applications were different for 
individuals and families, comparisons between the groups are useful to assess how the 
targeting of services may differ across groups. Individuals entered shelter at half the rate 
of families over a three-year period (6.4% vs. 12.8%).10  Overall individuals received 
services at lower rates (39.1%) than did families (66.5%). Further, risk factors for 
individuals differed from those for families.  
                                                
10 Compared to previous analyses, the rate of shelter entry for individuals is slightly 
higher when I include only cases with three years of data. 
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Table 2.3 provides descriptive statistics for applicants for prevention services who 
avoided or entered shelter by household status. Some differences in characteristics of the 
two groups of shelter entrants are especially noteworthy – those reported are significant 
by t-test or chi-square analysis at the .01 level. For demographic variables individual 
shelter entrants were more likely to be male and African American and less likely to be 
Hispanic than heads of families who entered shelter. The individuals were also older, and 
more likely to be married, to speak English, and to be veterans.   
For human capital variables, individual shelter entrants were more likely to have a 
high-school diploma, be employed, and be a recipient of public assistance.  For housing 
variables, individual entrants were twice as likely to be current leaseholders and a third as 
likely to be doubled up as family shelter entrants. Perhaps as a result, they had much 
lower rates of overcrowding or discord. They were more likely to pay over half of their 
incomes for housing and had higher arrears, on average.  Individuals reported higher 
levels of disrepair but had moved less frequently than families.  Additionally, for each of 
the housing variables, the trend in percentages across shelter status was in the opposite 
direction for individuals and families. 
Rates of chronic health and of mental illness did not differ significantly across 
groups of shelter entrants. However, individual shelter entrants were more likely to have 
histories of substance abuse and criminal justice involvement than family entrants. 
Individual shelter entrants reported lower levels of all forms of interpersonal discord, 
including rated discord, domestic violence, and involvement with protective services  
Individual shelter entrants had more prior involvement with the shelter system 
than their family counterparts.  They were more likely to report having stayed in shelter 
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previously, having applied for shelter in the last three months, and to be reintegrating into 
the community from an institution (27.5% vs. 11.5%) than families. The rate of previous 
shelter stays based on administrative records was much higher for individual shelter than 
for family shelter entrants. 
Table 2.3. Descriptive Comparisons of Individuals and Families, Continuous Variables 
in Italics 
 Individuals Families 
Predictora No Shelter  
 % or mean 
n = 9,663 
Shelter  
% or mean 
n = 557 
No Shelter  
 % or mean 
n = 9,686 
Shelter  
% or mean 
n = 1,149 
Demographics     
Male 38.1 45.5 9.8 6.7 
African American 55.1 69.8 51.9 56.3 
Hispanic 37.5 22.5 45.5 41.3 
English Speaker 71.6 95.0 77.7 86.3 
Age  44.6 41.6             33.7     30.1  
Married/partner 11.5 21.1 13.7 13.5 
Veteran 2.8 4.3    .7     .6 
Human Capital     
High school /GED 59.0 57.7 55.7 44.7 
Currently employed 55.1 71.7 51.6 43.6 
Currently receiving 
public assistance 56.8 62.0 26.9 37.5 
Lost benefits in past 
year 10.4 17.5 14.3 19.9ns 
Housing Conditions     
Name on lease 45.7 65.3 38.3 30.0 
Arrears  $1600 $3429 $1507  $1163 
Overcrowding or 
Discord  19.1 14.3 39.2 54.0 
Doubled up 26.8 19.8 47.2 63.6 
Verbal Eviction 
threatc 13.2 29.6   
Legal Eviction actionc 32.5 28.4   
Evictionf   55.3 66.1 
Rent > 50% income 38.0 47.6 33.5 28.6 
Unsafe conditions 6.4 10.1   9.1 11.3ns 
Level of disrepair  4.2 3.2   2.2    2.4  
Moves in past year  0.7 0.6     1.0   1.3  
Currently receiving 
subsidy  4.9 5.5 10.3   8.5ns 
Disability/Criminal     
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f- these variables were used in the families study only 
c- these variables were used in the individuals study only 
ns- chi-squared analyses or two-tailed t-tests between individual and family  shelter entrants were not 
significant at p = .01 
 
Table 2.4 compares risk factors that significantly predicted shelter entry across the 
two groups.  Families had many more predictors than did individuals, and for the most 
part, risk factors for individuals were a subset of those for families.  The only new risk 
factor for single individuals was the amount of rent arrears. With the exception of legal 
eviction, discussed earlier, variables that contributed to shelter entry for both groups did 
Justice 
Chronic 
health/hospitalization  53.6 44.7 42.2 44.9ns 
Mental illness/ 
hospitalization 21.6 18.4 12.4 13.9ns 
Substance 
problem/treatment 17.2 25.0   7.0 11.2 
Criminal justice 
involvement 21.1 31.0 11.9 17.4 
Interpersonal Discord     
Domestic violence 15.9 13.8 24.7 29.3 
Protective services 
involvementf 4.3 6.7   8.7 16.1 
Discord rating  2.1 1.6   2.3     2.7  
Childhood Experiences     
Young Motherf   22.3 33.6 
Adversity index  0.5 0.6   0.6     1.0  
Shelter History (self 
report) 
    
Shelter history as 
adult 23.4 75.0 24.4 47.0 
Shelter app. last 3 
mos.  3.3 17.1   3.1 11.0 
Reintegrating into 
community 10.4 27.5   6.2 11.5 
   By Administrative 
Data     
Previous shelter stay 7.2 70.6 10.8 25.0 
Number of Previous 
Shelter Applicationsf     0.3      0.7  
Found Eligible 
Previouslyf 
  
   2.4   8.0 
Exit to Subsidyf      2.9   5.7 
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so in the same direction.  Note that for families, self-reports of previous shelter were 
more predictive than administrative records, perhaps because families were more likely to 
include domestic violence shelters that would not be part of Department of Homeless 
Services records.  For individuals, the administrative records were stronger predictors.  In 
each case, these variables were correlated, so that only one entered the final model. 
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Table 2.4. Comparing Screening Models of Risk Factors across Families and Individuals 
Screening Model  
Risk Factors  
Significant risk 
factors for 
individuals* 
Significant risk 
factors for 
families* 
Demographics   
Age  Protective Protective 
Child Under 2 yrs old NA Risk 
Pregnant NA11 Risk 
Human Capital   
High school /GED  Protective 
Currently employed  Protective 
Currently receiving public 
assistance 
Risk Risk 
Housing Conditions   
Name on lease  Protective 
Overall Eviction threat   Risk 
Verbal Eviction threat Risk   
Legal Eviction action Protective**  
Arrears  Risk  
Moves in past year   Risk 
Disability/Criminal Justice   
Mental illness/ 
hospitalization 
Protective**  
Interpersonal Discord   
Protective services 
involvement 
 Risk 
Discord rating   Risk 
Childhood Experiences   
Adversity index    Risk 
Shelter History   
   By Self Report   
Shelter history as adult  Risk 
Shelter application last 3 
mos.  
Risk Risk 
Reintegrating into 
community 
Risk Risk 
   By Administrative Data   
Previous shelter Risk  
 *- significant variables included in a parsimonious model arrived at by eliminating non-significant 
predictors one at a time, and then checking whether any variables that had been eliminated regained 
predictive power after other variables had been eliminated. Public assistance re-entered the model after 
other correlated variables were eliminated. 
** - variables that were eliminated for the screening model based on robustness analyses 
 
 
                                                
11 By definition, individuals could not be pregnant or have a child under 2 years old.  
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Discussion 
The study developed a model for shelter entry among individuals who applied for 
HomeBase prevention services that was more efficient than the decisions of workers and 
also more efficient than a comparable model for families.  One predictor stood out: The 
rate of shelter entry was much higher for individuals with a previous stay in homeless 
shelters.  
Few other predictors contributed reliably to the full model. Additional significant 
risk indicators included lower age, higher arrears, verbal eviction threat, absence of a 
legal eviction threat, an application for shelter within three months, reintegrating from an 
institutional setting, and receipt of public assistance. Subsequent analyses cast doubt on 
the robustness of legal eviction and mental health predictors. Accordingly, these variables 
were eliminated from the Screening Model.  
In deploying the Screening Model, providers can choose cut-off scores on the 
model that correspond to tradeoffs of hit rates and false-alarm rates. As noted our earlier 
study of families (Shinn et al., 2013), a choice about cutoffs is not simply a technical 
decision.  Moral and ethical considerations, and costs to homeless people as well as to the 
City, should be considered. 
Individuals differed from families in several ways. Only 5.4% of those adults 
subsequently entered shelter, a lower rate than for families. The lower rate of shelter 
entry for individuals among HomeBase applicants is consistent with the lower overall 
rate of shelter use by individuals than by families in NYC (HUD, 2012c).  This pattern 
might not generalize beyond NYC because nationally, more shelter users are single adults 
(HUD, 2013a). Further, predictors of shelter entry were fewer for individuals than for 
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families. Finally, characteristics of individuals and families differed descriptively, in 
ways consistent with the literature (for a full description, see Table 2.3). However, in the 
context of other variables, such as previous shelter entry, many of the variables that 
distinguished individuals and families failed to predict shelter entry. For example, 
criminal justice involvement and substance abuse were higher for individuals, but neither 
variable predicted higher levels of shelter entry.  
 The comparison of individuals and families suggests that HomeBase is especially 
beneficial for applicants at the highest level of risk in both groups. For individuals, 
services did not seem to matter for applicants below the eighth decile of risk, most likely 
because there was little risk to avert. On the other hand the fact that legal eviction was 
associated with staying out of shelter might be taken as evidence for the effectiveness of 
eviction prevention services. Services seemed more helpful for individuals in the ninth 
decile of risk and above, as evidenced by the difference in rates of shelter entry for 
eligible and ineligible applicants. Risk rose faster for families, and services began to 
make a difference at about the sixth decile of risk.  
Some limitations of this investigation were similar to limitations of our study of 
family homelessness. For example, omitted variable bias likely exists for the current 
investigation. Further, inevitable data inaccuracies and effective services could weaken 
prediction. Additionally, the face of homelessness changes over time for both families 
and individuals. One primary challenge with targeting research includes a tradeoff 
between timely models with current risk factors and the allowance of sufficient time for 
at-risk applicants to enter shelter so that models can be created and evaluated.  Both 
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studies of individuals and of families suggest that following applicants for at least a year 
is useful – the majority of shelter entries happen within the first year. 
Some limitations are more applicable to the current study than for the 
investigation of homeless families. For example, HomeBase workers may successfully 
target services to individuals for particular risk factors.  To the extent that workers 
successfully neutralize these risks, the risk factors would not contribute to the overall risk 
model, so that the effectiveness of services may be undetectable. Finally, I make a similar 
caution about model uptake in other locales as we did for the investigation of homeless 
families: the model may be a good starting point in the absence of local data, but the 
approach to better efficiency rather than the specific model is the transferrable tool from 
the current investigation.  
 Efficiency, a vital component of successful prevention, can be increased 
dramatically for both individuals and families by means of an empirical model to target 
services to those who can benefit most. Serving the same proportion of individuals with a 
Screening Model instead of current decisions would have increased the hit rate to over 
90% and reduced misses by over 85%. However, targeting remains imperfect as 
evidenced by the fact that most individuals, like families, avoid shelter entry, even in the 
highest risk decile. Although targeting is imperfect, even with the empirical models, a 
large body of research suggests that empirically based models tend to be superior to 
worker judgments (Ægisdóttir et al., 2006; Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Grove et al., 
2000), as was the case here.  
In sum, as for families, the Department of Homeless Services could improve its 
targeting of HomeBase applicants likely to enter shelter by adopting an empirical risk 
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model. Directing services only to adults who have been in shelter previously according to 
Department of Homeless Services records would increase correct predictions while 
serving many fewer applicants. However, if the City can serve the same proportion of 
individuals as currently, the screening survey would correctly target an even higher 
proportion of subsequent shelter entrants (over 90%). Even a one-variable model based 
on administrative records of prior shelter experiences is far more efficient than current 
decisions. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
DOES CONTEXT MATTER? COMPARING RISK FACTORS AND 
TARGETING EFFICIENCY FOR DIFFERING MANIFESTATIONS OF 
HOMELESSNESS IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CA, AND NEW YORK CITY, NY 
 
Introduction 
Community-based programs that seek to prevent homelessness efficiently require 
identifying people who are at high risk for becoming homeless in the absence of services. 
Relatively few models evaluate risk for homelessness explicitly, and these are confined to 
particular locales (Barnett et al., 2011; Shinn et al., 1998, 2013) or populations 
(Greenberg et al., 2006; Hudson & Vissing, 2008). Little is known about how well 
models generalize across social contexts. Differences in the geography, demographics, 
housing and labor markets, as well as social policies could render models developed in 
one locale useless for application in another. Risk models may also depend on definitions 
of homelessness. The factors that put one at risk for entering shelter (the most common 
operational definition of homelessness) may not be the same as factors that put one at risk 
for housing instability. The present paper replicates a process used to generate a risk 
model for shelter entry in one location (New York City, NY) in another site (Alameda 
County, CA) and compares the resulting models both across geography and, in the case 
of Alameda County, across definitions of homelessness. It provides one window into the 
extent to which context matters in efforts to prevent homelessness.  
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The prevention programs in New York City and Alameda County targeted similar 
populations (homeless families and individuals), but used different risk factor 
assessments and different outcome variables. The Homebase program serves New York 
City with homelessness prevention and has participated in empirical research to examine 
its effectiveness (Messeri, O’Flaherty, & Goodman, 2011; Rolston, Geyer, & Locke, 
2013) and improve the efficiency of its targeting strategies (Shinn et al., 2013). The 
EveryOne Home program serves Alameda County, CA, with homelessness prevention 
and seeks to examine its effectiveness and improve the efficiency of its targeting models. 
Because the programs are the major providers of community-based homelessness 
prevention services in their respective geographies, the programs will be referred to as: 
Alameda County and NYC prevention services.  
Homelessness prevention in Alameda County and prevention services in NYC 
differ in at least two ways. The first difference is cultural variation in the systems set up 
to combat homelessness. The prevention system in Alameda County is less integrated 
than that of NYC. Further, NYC has an explicit right to shelter; Alameda does not. The 
second difference is variation in risk factors and outcomes, attributable to structural 
factors including housing, economics, demographics, and climate. These structural 
factors are sometimes modeled as community-level domains in homelessness 
investigations (Byrne et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2003). Community-level domains for each 
program are described further in the methods section.  
For the purposes of comparison, part of this study is an explicit replication of the 
methods of previous studies in NYC that investigated risk factors for homelessness for 
families and childless adults. The current study adds to the existing efficiency 
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investigations by answering the following questions: What is the pattern of subsequent 
homelessness for prevention applicants in Alameda County? Which risk factors 
contribute to homelessness? How do risk factors differ for models predicting different 
manifestations of homelessness? How does model efficiency for prevention applicants in 
Alameda County compare with efficiency for models developed in NYC?  
Targeting Efficiency and Ecological Contexts of Homelessness 
Successful targeting requires the identification of risk factors that lead to 
homelessness and the evaluation of the efficiency of targeting models to correctly direct 
services to those who can benefit most (Shinn et al., 2013). Although services may be 
useful for all people in extreme poverty, targeting is meant to differentiate service 
recipients who need services to avoid homelessness from those who would avoid 
homelessness otherwise. Efficiency is defined as the extent to which a targeting model 
directs services to those who benefit most from services. Unless prevention services are 
affordable enough to be offered universally, both efficient targeting and effective services 
are vital to the prevention program’s success (Burt et al., 2007).  
Despite the expressed need of prevention programs to improve targeting services 
and some promising research (Barnett et al., 2011; Shinn et al, 1998, 2013), targeting 
efficiency is often disappointing and investigations of efficiency are mostly absent in the 
literature (Greer & Shinn, in progress). Often the efficiency of targeting models is 
underwhelming (Greenburg et al., 2006; Hudson & Vissing, 2010). The most common 
criterion for access to homelessness prevention services is eviction (US Conference of 
Mayors, 2008), but most people who are evicted do not become homeless. For example, a 
decision model based only on eviction proved to be only slightly better than chance in 
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predicting homelessness among families in NYC (Shinn et al., 2013).  For community-
based prevention programs across the nation, differentiating the characteristics of poor 
people who need services to avoid homelessness from those who will avoid homelessness 
without services remains a highly desired but difficult undertaking.  
An ecological framework from community psychology (Bronfenbrenner 1979; 
Nelson and Prilleltensky 2005; Toro, Trickett, Wall, & Salem, 1991) offers a way to 
understand differences in risk factors and outcomes across settings. Nooe and Patterson 
(2010) put forward an ecology of homelessness with individual- and structural-level risk 
factors that lead to multiple types of homelessness. Such a framework calls for an 
understanding of risk that is rooted in environment. Further, previous research points out 
that interventions are always “interventions-in-context” (p. 124). The specificities of 
implementation are dependent on the nurturing or obstructing social context of their 
environments (Cornish and Campbell, 2009).  
 The ecological perspective suggests that inconsistencies in risk factors for 
homelessness across studies are likely attributable to environmental differences. 
Homelessness studies are often framed with at least some of the following community-
level domains that have been associated with homelessness: housing markets, economic 
conditions, demographic composition, safety net, climate, and transience (Lee et al., 
2003; Byrne et al., 2012). For example, Burt (1991) found the housing market domain, 
and specifically, a lack of affordable housing, to be the main contributor to homelessness 
in some cities. Other cities with high homelessness rates had ample affordable housing, 
but lacked job training, supported housing, or drug-treatment facilities (Burt, 1991). 
Further economic conditions, such as poverty rates, have been positively associated with 
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increased risk for homelessness (Early & Olson, 2002). Additionally, some structural 
models include temperature as a predictor (i.e., climate domain) and find significant 
relationships between warmer temperatures and increased homelessness (Raphael, 2010). 
Finally, increased mobility into an area has been positively associated with increased 
homelessness (Lee et al., 2003). Community-level domains are useful for framing 
ecological determinants of homelessness. However, inconsistencies in defining risk and 
homelessness make it difficult to link specific risk factors with homelessness rates for 
individuals across diverse geographies.  
In addition to the different characteristics associated with risk, the ecological 
framework suggests that different definitions of homelessness might capture the spectrum 
of housing instability in different settings. Definitions of homelessness can vary due to 
research interests or political goals (Hopper, 1991) as well as the availability of data on 
different indicators and interpretations of what it means to be homeless. HUD provides a 
lengthy definition of homelessness that focuses on the absence of a suitable residence 
(NAEH, 2012). The definition of homelessness includes a set of risk factors that permits 
some additional families and youth to be classified as homeless and thus expands the pool 
of eligibility for federal assistance from previous definitions. However, the European 
Union (EU) definition has a greater variety of measures of housing instability 
(FEANTSA, 2005), including the following typology: 
• rooflessness (without a shelter of any kind, sleeping rough) 
• houselessness (with a place to sleep but only temporarily in institutions or 
shelter) 
• living in insecure housing (threatened with severe exclusion due to insecure 
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tenancies, eviction, domestic violence) 
• living in inadequate housing (in caravans on illegal campsites, in unfit housing, 
in extreme overcrowding) (FEANTSA, 2005). 
Predictors of homelessness might differ for varying manifestations of homelessness. The 
current chapter seeks to investigate risk factor differences across NYC and Alameda 
County, CA.  Although risk factors that are assessed and available for modeling are not 
identical in Alameda and NYC, risk-factor domains will be compared across studies and 
similarities and differences will be discussed.  Further, the current chapter explores 
differing manifestations of homelessness within Alameda County. The remainder of this 
paper compares the locales and the samples, develops the models for Alameda County, 
and then compares them to the models previously developed for New York City (Chapter 
2; Shinn et al., 2013). 
Methods 
 
Ecological Characteristics 
 
Table 3.1 explores the ecological context of Alameda County and NYC in 
comparison with each other and with the US as a whole.  Starting with housing markets, 
NYC has lower rates of homeownership, a higher median rent, and a higher rental 
vacancy rate than Alameda County, although both communities have far lower rental 
vacancy rates than the national average. For economic conditions, NYC has a higher 
unemployment rate and a higher rate of people earning less than 50% of the poverty level 
than Alameda County.  In NYC, there are higher proportions of African Americans, 
Hispanics and single-person households as well as lower proportions of baby-boomers 
than in Alameda County. In terms of the social safety net, NYC has a higher proportion 
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of households receiving SSI or public assistance, a higher maximum monthly TANF 
payment, and a higher per capita mental health expenditure than in Alameda County. The 
temperature differential from the average high in July to the average low in January and 
the amount of annual precipitation are much higher in NYC than in Alameda County. 
Finally, there are lower rates of people moving in NYC than in Alameda County. 
Table 3.1. Community-level domains in Alameda County and New York City 
Domain Alameda 
County 
New York 
City 
United States 
Housing Market    
Owner occupancy rate1 54.5% 32.6% 66.1% 
Rent (median) $8922 $1,1912 N/A 
Rental vacancy rate (MSA) 4.1%3 4.9%3 12.4%1 
Economic Conditions    
Civil labor force unemployed1 9.2% 9.5% 8.7% 
Persons with incomes < 50% 
poverty level1 5.4% 7.8% 6.6% 
Demographic Composition    
Black1 14.0% 26.6% 13.5% 
Hispanic/Latina(o)1 22.2% 28.4% 16.1% 
Baby Boomers (45-64 y.o.)1 25.9% 24.2% 26.1% 
1-person household1 27.7% 32.5% 27.3% 
Safety Net    
Households in poverty receiving 
Public Assistance or SSI1 31.0% 31.6% 26.0% 
Maximum monthly TANF 
payment for family of 3 (state)4 $638 $753 N/A 
Per Capita expenditure to 
mental health agency (state)5 $152.60 $256.31 $120.50 
Climate    
July avg high-Jan avg low6 25.6°F 57.5°F N/A 
Annual Precipitation6 20.8in 46.6in N/A 
Transience    
Household moved before 
staying in home for 1+ years1 16.0% 11.4% 15.4% 
1American Community Survey 2007-2011 
2HUD FMR estimates for efficiency apartment 2013 
3Flanagan & Schwartz (2013) Rental Housing Market Condition Measures: A Comparison of U.S. 
Metropolitan Areas From 2009 to 2011. American Community Survey Briefs 
4Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2011 
5Kaiser-Family Foundation 2010 
6NOAA National Climatic Data Center 1981-2010 
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Samples 
Participants in Alameda County were 2,761 people who applied for the 
Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-housing Program (HPRP) from the county’s 
eight housing resource centers between October 21, 2009, and April 28, 2012.  
Applicants provided details for the following domains: demographic variables, human 
capital, housing conditions, disability, interpersonal discord, and shelter history. Based on 
their cumulative score on an index developed by the County, 83% of participants were 
offered services using a triage approach.12 For the analyses of the Alameda County data, 
the current study replicates the methods used in NYC (Chapter 2; Shinn et al., 2013). I 
impute missing data for predictors with Stata, including auxiliary variables according to 
the literature (Graham, et al., 2007; Sinharay et al., 2001). 
Participants in NYC were 21,325 applicants for the Homebase prevention 
program, of which 11,105 were families and 10,220 were individuals without children. 
Participants applied for services from September 28, 2004, to December 29, 2010. At 
application, intake workers surveyed participants about the following domains: 
demographic variables, human capital, housing conditions, disability, interpersonal 
discord, childhood experiences, and shelter history. Workers then decided who should 
receive services, without following any particular model. 
Predicting Time to Homelessness in Alameda County 
The current study predicts time between the initial application for services and 
subsequent homelessness in Alameda County for three increasingly inclusive definitions 
                                                
12 For a detailed description of participant characteristics and the eligibility process, see 
chapter 4 of this dissertation. The risk-scoring variable in Alameda County was not 
highly correlated with the risk scores for the three models in the current study.  
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of homelessness: 1) literal homelessness, 2) literal homelessness or imminent housing 
loss (termed threatened homelessness), and 3) literal homelessness, imminent housing 
loss, or unstable housing (termed any housing instability). The broadest two definitions of 
homelessness were created from the following variables that share some similarities with 
the EU definition of homelessness. 
• Literal homelessness (according to HUD’s definition); similar to rooflessness and 
houselessness 
o In a shelter, transitional housing, or in a place not meant for habitation  
o Escaping a domestic violence situation (similar to insecure housing) 
o Just exited jail, substance abuse treatment, hospital, psychiatric facility, or 
foster care setting from shelter or the streets 
• Imminent housing loss; similar to insecure housing 
o Being evicted, discharged, or otherwise notified of imminent housing loss 
• Unstable housing and at-risk for losing housing; similar to inadequate housing 
o Doubled up, being evicted from public or assisted housing 
 
The measure of literal homelessness derives from Alameda’s Homelessness Management 
Information System (HMIS) and is primarily shelter entry.  Only episodes of 
homelessness that began after the date the participant applied for services are counted. 
The other two outcomes include literal homelessness based on HMIS data and additional 
information available only for those applicants for Alameda County’s Homelessness 
Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing Program who applied for services a second time 
(whether or not they received them on the initial application that marked their entry into 
the study).  Threatened homelessness includes self-reported literal homelessness or 
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imminent housing loss upon reapplication. Any housing instability includes the first two 
and additionally self-reported unstable housing or being at-risk for losing housing upon 
reapplication. Because the self-reported outcomes are available only for the subset that 
re-applied for services, results will be interpreted with the potential for bias in mind.   
Results:  Alameda County 
Pattern of Subsequent Homelessness 
 The patterns of subsequent homelessness are similar across outcomes in Alameda 
County. For that reason, only one Kaplan-Meier survival curve and one Hazard function 
are presented here. Time to subsequent homelessness was calculated by subtracting the 
date of subsequent homelessness from the date of application for HPRP. The main 
differences across outcomes are the final rates of those experiencing the outcome: HMIS 
homelessness (2.2%), threatened homelessness (9.0%), and any housing instability 
(14.2%). Figure 3.1 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival curve for the outcome of any 
housing instability. This curve suggests that most applicants for prevention services 
avoided subsequent instability. Figure 3.2 shows the hazard function for any housing 
instability. This function suggests that the greatest risk for housing instability occurred 
just after participants apply for services. These findings are similar to investigations of 
homelessness prevention in NYC (Greer et al., in progress, Shinn et al., 2013).  
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Figure 3.1. Kaplan-Meier Survival 
Curve for Any Housing Instability in 
Alameda County, from 2009 to 2012 
 
Figure 3.2. Hazard Function for Any 
Housing Instability in Alameda County, 
from 2009 to 2012
 
Risk Factors for Alameda County 
Table 3.2 shows risk and protective factors in Alameda County for each level of 
homelessness. Model 1 investigates predictors of literal homelessness according to HMIS 
records. Model 2 expands the outcome to include homelessness or imminent loss of 
housing. Model 3 expands the outcome further than the previous two models by including 
any report of housing instability as defined in the methods section.  The Table includes 
all variables that reliably predicted any of the three outcomes, arrived at by the following 
trimming procedure.  
For each model, predictors that failed to reliably contribute to the model were 
eliminated one at a time starting with the least reliable predictor. When only reliable 
predictors remained in the model, I added the eliminated variables back into the model 
one at a time to determine whether their contributions were reliable in the context of a 
parsimonious model. I then added back predictors that were reliable in either of the other 
models. Findings across all models control for all other variables in the model, and 
including all variables that mattered for any of the models allows a consistent set of 
controls. Including these additional variables from other models did not affect the 
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reliability of other variables already in the models. The results across models are reported 
in Table 3.2. Variables that failed to contribute to any model (p < .05) are listed in the 
table footnotes. Across models, the domains of demographic variables, disability/criminal 
justice, and interpersonal discord failed to reliably contribute to predicting the outcomes.  
The human capital variables that were most important varied somewhat by 
outcome. Receiving public benefits13 was associated with more than double the risk for 
literal homelessness, compared to not receiving such benefits. Part time (rather than full 
time or no employment) was associated with 1.5 times the risk for threatened 
homelessness and 1.3 times the risk for any housing instability.  Earning less than 30% of 
the Area Median Income (AMI) was associated with almost double the risk for the two 
broader definitions of homelessness compared to earning more than 30% AMI.  
The housing conditions domain included five risk factors that were reliable in one 
or more of the models, which is the highest number of significant covariates in any of the 
domains. Rates of literal homelessness were more than double for applicants who were 
living doubled-up with another household in the same dwelling unit compared to those 
without such living situations.  Being doubled-up was not a reliable predictor of the 
broader homelessness outcomes. Having one or more evictions in the past five years was 
associated with almost double the risk for literal homelessness and over 1.4 times the risk 
for threatened homelessness compared to those without such histories, although a history 
of eviction was not significantly associated with the broader outcome of any housing 
instability. On the other hand, being evicted from public housing at the time of 
                                                
13 Defined as receiving any of the following: SNAP, MEDICAID, MEDICARE, SCHIP, 
WIC, VA services, TANF childcare, TANF transportation, other TANF (CalWORKS), or 
Section 8. 
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application was associated with 2.2 times the risk for threatened homelessness and over 
1.7 times the risk for any housing instability compared to those without such an eviction, 
but being evicted from public housing was not associated reliably with literal 
homelessness. Similarly, paying more than 40% of one’s income for rent was associated 
with almost double the risk for the two broadest homelessness outcomes, but it did not 
reliably predict literal homelessness.  
Having outstanding debt in excess of $1000 was associated with about 1.5 times 
the risk for all three homelessness outcomes compared to having no such debt. Finally, 
for the shelter variables domain, those who reported spending the night before applying 
for services as homeless14 experienced rates of subsequent homelessness (that is an 
episode of literal homelessness that began after the date of the application for services) 
almost ten-fold higher than those who did not so report. The variable was not reliably 
associated with the two broadest homelessness models.15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
14 Defined as 1) Emergency shelter, including hotel or motel paid for with emergency 
shelter voucher, 2) Place not meant for habitation inclusive of non-housing service site, 
or 3) Transitional housing for homeless persons 
15 I further investigated interactions of treatment with each risk factor to determine 
whether risk profiles differed according to whether participants received treatment. I 
found no significant interactions. Thus I omit interactions from the models above.  
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Table 3.2. Risk Factors for Homelessness: Alameda County 
Predictor Model 1:  
Literal homelessness 
 
(n = 60) 
Model 2: 
Threatened 
Homelessness  
(n = 248) 
Model 3: 
Any Housing 
Instability  
(n = 393) 
 HR CI HR CI HR CI 
Demographicsa       
N/A       
Human Capitalb       
Part-time employment 1.72 0.93-3.18 1.49** 1.11-2.00 1.34* 1.06-1.70 
Receiving public benefits 2.08* 1.08-4.01 1.26 0.95-1.66 0.98 0.79-1.22 
< 30% AMI 2.05 0.73-5.78 1.85** 1.20-2.85 1.92*** 1.37-2.70 
Housing Conditionsc       
Doubled up 2.72** 1.45-5.09 1.01 0.73-1.41 0.98 0.75-1.27 
Eviction history 1.94* 1.08-3.51 1.43* 1.02-2.00 1.26 0.95-1.66 
Being evicted from public 
housing 1.06 0.24-4.60 2.20** 1.43-3.38 1.73** 1.21-2.48 
Rent > 40% income 1.53 0.44-5.31 2.18** 1.36-3.50 2.26*** 1.57-3.26 
Outstanding debt > $1000 1.69* 1.00-2.86 1.37* 1.06-1.76 1.40** 1.14-1.71 
Disability/Criminal Justiced       
N/A       
Interpersonal Discorde       
N/A       
Shelter Historyf       
Previous night homeless 9.80*** 5.40-17.81 1.21 0.89-1.66 0.83 0.63-1.10 
a Unreliable variables included Female, African American, Hispanic, Married, Veteran, Pregnant, Age, 
Family vs. Individual status 
b Unreliable variables included High School diploma/GED, Vocational training; AMI = Area Median 
Income 
c Unreliable variables included Leaseholder history 
d Unreliable variables included Disabled, Unhealthy compared to peers, Criminal justice history 
e Unreliable variables included Domestic violence history, Escaping domestic violence currently 
f Unreliable variables included Homeless more than one time in the last year, Previously homeless self 
reports, Previously homeless HMIS data 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
The models suggest that the populations subject to the various forms of risk are 
different, and Table 3.3 shows the percentages of people in alternate divisions of the 
groups: people who experienced literal homelessness, people who experienced imminent 
loss of housing, but not literal homelessness, and people who experienced unstable 
housing, but not imminent loss of housing or literal homelessness, and people who did 
not experience any of these forms of subsequent housing instability. 
   
 
 
75 
The literal homelessness group appears to be different than the groups that 
reported imminent housing loss or unstable housing, and all other groups appear to be 
different than the group that did not experience any subsequent instability. All three of 
the unstable groups had higher rates of part-time employment than the group with no 
housing instability. Those who experienced literal homelessness reported the highest 
rates of receiving public benefits, and both of the remaining groups that experienced 
instability reported lower rates of receiving public benefits than the group reporting no 
instability.  
The proportion of those who were extremely poor was highest for the literal 
homelessness group, and the remaining instability groups had higher rates of extremely 
poor people than those with no housing instability. Being doubled up and having a 
history of eviction was highest for the group experiencing literal homelessness. Paying 
more than 40% of one’s income for rent and having more than $1000 in debt were higher 
across the groups with housing instability than for the group with no housing instability. 
Finally, spending the previous night homeless before applying for services was much 
higher for the group that experienced subsequent homelessness, and those in the 
imminent housing loss or unstable housing groups experienced rates lower than the group 
with no housing instability.  
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Table 3.3. Proportions with Risk Factors for Alternate Groups: Alameda County     
Predictora Literal 
Homelessness 
(n = 60) 
Imminent 
Housing Loss 
(n = 188) 
Unstable 
Housing 
(n = 145) 
No Housing 
Instability 
(n = 2368) 
Human Capital     
Part-time employment 23.73 24.47 22.76 16.97 
Receiving public benefits 79.66 64.36 64.14 67.24 
< 30% AMI 93.22 89.36 88.97 81.72 
Housing Conditions     
Doubled up 26.32 16.67 19.44 17.53 
Eviction history 29.31 14.12 13.33 12.55 
Being evicted from public 
housing 3.51 13.11 6.99 7.24 
Rent > 40% income 94.00 89.89 90.07 81.57 
Outstanding debt > $1000 47.46 44.68 48.97 38.54 
Shelter History     
Previous night homeless 64.41 9.57 6.90 21.70 
a Only reliable predictors from Table 2 are included here. 
Risk Profiles 
 Next, I investigated whether some applicants were at such high risk that services 
ceased to be beneficial, as would be implied by a triage model, in which services are 
given to those at intermediate levels of risk. I calculated risk scores for each applicant for 
each model based on average predicted scores across fifty imputed data sets16 and plotted 
the proportion of applicants who had the adverse outcome at each quintile of risk, 
separately for those who did and did not receive HPRP services.  Results are shown in 
Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.  Ignoring the receipt of HPRP services, rates of housing 
instability tend to increase as risk increases.  However, the shapes of the risk profiles 
differ across outcomes.  
 In the risk profiles for Figure 3.3, rates of literal homelessness remain close to 0 
for the first two risk quintiles. However, for risk scores of three to five, rates of 
homelessness gradually increase. Rates of literal homelessness are quite similar for those 
                                                
16 Although previous studies divide risk into deciles, the smaller sample size of the 
current study was better suited to quintiles of risk.  
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who did and did not receive HPRP services in the first four risk quintiles.  However, the 
profiles diverge for the highest level of risk. Here, the difference in rates of homelessness 
for recipients and non-recipients of HPRP is at its maximum. Accordingly, services 
seemed most helpful for those in the highest risk quintile. The risk profiles for Figure 3.4 
show rates of threatened homelessness across quintiles of risk. Here services made little 
difference in the first two quintiles.  The risk profiles for recipients and non-recipients of 
services diverged in the third quintile of risk and were largest for the top three quintiles.  
Again, there was no evidence that any applicants were too risky to benefit from 
preventive services – applicants in the top three quintiles appeared to benefit from 
services, which seemed to make the largest difference for intermediate categories of risk. 
Figure 3.5 contains the risk profile for rates of any housing instability across 
quintiles of risk. For each quintile, applicants who received services experienced housing 
instability at lower rates than those who did not receive services. Further, the differences 
between groups are most apparent for the lower and upper quintiles. None of the graphs 
suggest that applicants were at such high risk that services failed to be beneficial, and the 
graph of any housing instability suggests that services might reduce unwanted outcomes 
regardless of risk level.  
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Figure 3.3. Risk Profile for Literal Homelessness  
 
 
Figure 3.4. Risk Profile for Threatened Homelessness 
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Figure 3.5. Risk Profile for Any Housing Instability 
 
 
Comparing Risk Factors for Alameda County to NYC 
Table 3.4 compares risk factors for literal homelessness in Alameda County with 
parallel models derived previously (Chapter 2; Shinn et al., 2013) to predict shelter entry 
for individuals and families in New York City.17  Literal homelessness was chosen in 
Alameda because it is most similar to shelter entry in NYC. Across locations, intake 
questions were not identical. Accordingly, Table 3.4 includes categories of risk along 
each row and specific variables under the column headings of Alameda County, NYC 
Families, and NYC Individuals. Variables that mattered in one location but were not 
available in the other are labeled NA. Those that were tested and did not predict are 
shown with two dashes. The literal homeless model in Alameda County shares many risk 
factors with the shelter entry model for individuals in NYC. The lack of age as a 
                                                
17 Separate analyses for families and individuals in Alameda yielded substantively similar 
results for the broader risk models that predicted threatened homelessness as well as any 
housing instability. Separate models predicting literal homelessness for the two groups 
exhibited a few differences (e.g., doubled up was a risk factor for individuals, but not 
families). However, fewer than 30 family applicants experienced literal homelessness and 
there were many estimation problems. Appendix Chapter 3 shows descriptive differences 
between individuals and families in Alameda.  
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protective factor for Alameda County constitutes the primary difference between the 
models. Having spent the previous night homeless at the time of an application for 
services is the strongest predictor of subsequent literal homelessness for Alameda 
County, and this variable is correlated with previous shelter records and self reports (i.e., 
the strongest predictors of shelter entry for NYC models), but the particular variable was 
not asked in New York City.    
Some differences across models are due to the absence of variables in at least one 
location. For example, applicants in Alameda County were not asked about mental 
illness, a factor that approached significance for NYC individuals. Further, Alameda 
County did not collect information about adverse childhood experiences, which were 
combined to form a risk factor index for families in NYC. NYC applicants were asked 
many more interpersonal discord variables than Alameda County applicants, and these 
mattered for families.  There was also some consistency in variables that were not 
associated with homelessness either location.  These included self-reports of domestic 
violence and criminal justice histories. 
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Table 3.4. Comparing Literal Homelessness and Shelter-Entry Risk in Alameda to NYC 
Risk Categories*  Alameda NYC families NYC individuals 
Demographics    
Family vs. Individual -- NA NA18 
Age   Younger Younger 
Child age NA Child under 2 NA 
Pregnant -- Pregnant NA 
Human Capital    
Education -- No High school/ 
GED 
-- 
Employment --19 Not Employed  -- 
Currently receiving 
public assistance 
Receiving public 
benefits 
Receiving public 
assistance 
Receiving public 
assistance 
Housing Conditions    
Name on lease Doubled up Not a leaseholder -- 
Overall Eviction threat Eviction in the 
last five years; 
Being evicted 
from public 
housing 
Any eviction 
threat 
 
NA 
Verbal eviction 
threat; 
No legal eviction 
threat** 
NA 
Outstanding debt  Outstanding debt 
$1000 or more 
NA 
-- NA 
 
High Housing 
Arrears 
Mobility NA Number of moves 
in last year 
-- 
Disability/Criminal 
Justice 
   
Disability -- -- No history of mental 
illness or 
hospitalization** 
Interpersonal 
Discord 
   
Protective services 
involvement 
NA History of 
protective 
services 
-- 
Discord rating NA High discord with 
landlord, 
leaseholder, or 
-- 
                                                
18 Separate models were estimated for individuals and families in New York City, and the data covered 
different time periods, so that family status cannot be formally tested. However, it is clear that among 
applicants for prevention services, families were at higher risk of shelter entry than single individuals 
(12.8% of families entered shelter vs. 6.4% of individuals).  
19 The hazard ratios for part-time employment and low income were even larger in the model predicting 
literal homelessness than in the other two models, but the confidence intervals included a ratio of 1, 
meaning no effect.  
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within household 
Childhood 
Experiences 
NA   
Adversity index    Multiple 
childhood 
adversity 
experiences  
-- 
Shelter History    
Shelter history as adult Spent last night 
homeless 
 
 
 
NA 
 
 
 
NA 
Shelter history as 
adult (self report); 
Shelter 
application in last 
three months; 
Reintegrating into 
community from 
an institution 
 
NA 
Shelter history as 
adult (administrative 
record); Shelter 
application in last 
three months; 
Reintegrating into 
community from an 
institution 
*- significant variables included in a parsimonious model arrived at by eliminating non-significant 
predictors one at a time, and then checking whether any variables that had been eliminated regained 
predictive power after other variables had been eliminated. For individuals, public assistance re-entered the 
model after other correlated variables were eliminated. 
** - variables that were eliminated for NYC individuals based on robustness analyses 
 
Model Efficiency 
 Figures 3.6 through 3.10 show the ROC curves across models, computed with the 
parametric probit ROC command in Stata. Table 3.5 compares model efficiency in two 
ways: by reporting the estimated hit rates and confidence intervals that correspond to the 
tradeoff in false-alarm rates of .10, .25, and .50, and by reporting the Area Under the 
Curve (AUC) for each model. Better models have higher hit rates for a given false alarm 
rate and larger AUC values. If the AUC for a model were .50, the estimated curve would 
fall along the 50% reference line (i.e., each of the diagonals in Figures 3.6 through 3.10). 
However, a model that perfectly predicts an outcome would capture all of the area (i.e., 
the AUC value would be 1.00).  
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Several conclusions are apparent across models in Alameda County (Figures 3.6-
3.8). First, the ROC curve for literal homeless (Figure 3.6) is far more efficient than the 
ROC curves for the two broader definitions of homelessness in Figures 3.7 and 3.8.  The 
confidence intervals for the hit rates for the literal homeless model in Table 3.5 fall above 
values from the confidence intervals of the remaining two models at each level of false 
alarms examined. However, there is substantial overlap in the confidence intervals for the 
models with the two broader aspects of homelessness. Further, the AUC value for the 
literal homeless model is significantly larger than the AUC values for the remaining two 
Alameda models. Accordingly, it was possible to target literal homelessness more 
efficiently than broader forms of homelessness in Alameda County; the two broader 
models do not differ significantly in terms of efficiency.  
Comparisons with NYC. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 present ROC curves for the two 
investigations of shelter entry in NYC (Chapter 2; Shinn et al., 2013)20, and Table 3.5 
includes parallel measures of model efficiency. In terms of efficiency, the model for 
Alameda County falls between the efficiency of the two models in NYC – it is more 
efficient than the model for families (especially at higher false alarm rates) and less 
efficient than the model for individuals.  
 
 
                                                
20 ROC curves in the current study were calculated slightly differently than the 
nonparametric ROC curves in the previous studies. This was done for two reasons. First, 
the parametric ROC estimate is smooth, and the overall shape of the ROC is more clearly 
seen compared to non-parametric estimations. Second, the parametric models permit 
estimates of hit rates with confidence intervals for given false alarm rates. Although the 
curves were estimated differently, the AUC values only differed slightly. For families, 
the non-parametric AUC value was .76 (compared to .75 in the parametric model). For 
individuals the non-parametric AUC value was .92 (compared to .93 for the parametric 
model).  
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Figure 3.6. ROC: Alameda Literal 
Homelessness   
 
 
Figure 3.7. ROC: Alameda Threatened 
Homelessness 
 
 
Figure 3.8. ROC: Alameda Any 
Housing Instability  
 
 
Figure 3.9. ROC: NYC Families Shelter 
Entry        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10. ROC: NYC Individuals 
Shelter Entry 
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Table 3.5. Efficiency Comparisons for Alameda County and NYC 
 
Notes:  
Est. = Estimate 
CI = Confidence Interval 
FA = False Alarm Rate 
AUC = Area Under the Curve  
Discussion 
The current study investigated risk factors for homelessness in Alameda County 
and compared results to findings from previous studies in NYC. Receiving public 
benefits was positively associated with literal homelessness in Alameda County and 
across shelter-entry models in NYC, suggesting that benefit programs may not be enough 
for at-risk applicants to avoid homelessness. Previous homelessness stood out as the 
primary predictor across sites, however, some variables differed. NYC might ask 
applicants whether they spent the previous night homeless before applying for services, 
because this predictor was more reliable than HMIS records or self-reports of previous 
homelessness for Alameda County applicants. Further, eviction was associated with 
literal homelessness and shelter entry across locations, although the type of eviction 
differed across sites. NYC might ask applicants if they are being evicted from public 
housing, because such an eviction mattered for Alameda applicants above and beyond 
having an eviction history. Younger age predicted shelter entry in NYC, but not in 
 Alameda County New York City 
 Model 1: Literal 
Homelessness 
Model 2: 
Threatened 
Homelessness 
Model 3: Any 
Housing 
Instability 
Shelter Entry 
NYC Families 
Shelter Entry 
NYC Individuals 
 Est. CI Est. CI Est. CI Est. CI Est. CI 
Hit Rate 
(FA = .10) .527 .424-.631 .174 .132-.215 .183 .148-.217 .410 .388-.433 .831 .805-.857 
Hit Rate 
(FA = .25) .760 .671-.850 .398 .346-.451 .406 .363-.450 .623 .601-.645 .914 .895-.932 
Hit Rate 
(FA = .50) .922 .868-.975 .692 .643-.741 .693 .653-.733 .820 .803-.837 .965 .955-.976 
AUC .835 .787-.884 .630 .600-.664 .633 .605-.661 .753 .739-.766 .934 .922-.946 
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Alameda County. Additionally, having outstanding debt predicted literal homelessness in 
Alameda County, and high arrears predicted shelter entry for NYC individuals. The 
number of moves in the last year was a risk factor for families in NYC but not for 
individuals in NYC, and Alameda County applicants might be asked about mobility in 
future studies. Further, Alameda County could consider asking applicants about child 
protective services, discord, and adverse childhood experiences, because these were 
reliable predictors for NYC families.  
Across sites, previous homelessness and a lack of affordable housing seem to be 
the strongest factors that lead to literal homelessness or shelter entry. Conversely, 
individual disabilities, criminal justice involvement, and domestic violence failed to 
predict homelessness across sites (except to the extent that they may have predicted 
housing affordability). Although these factors may exacerbate risk for homelessness 
among those who lack access to housing, the dearth of alternative, affordable housing 
seems critical to avoid homelessness. Additional reliable predictors appear to be linked to 
financial costs (e.g., having a young child in NYC) or to access to informal housing 
assistance (e.g., discord, childhood experiences in NYC). These findings support an 
understanding that the origins of homelessness are primarily structural (Byrne, Munley, 
Fargo, Montgomery & Culhane, 2012; Israel, Toro, & Oullette, 2010; Shinn, 2007; 
2010).  
This study asks whether context matters in regards to homelessness risk and found 
that, across two sites, risk models were remarkably similar, differing more sharply in the 
questions that were asked than the answers found. It is somewhat surprising that context 
did not matter more. Few minor contextual differences emerged: the lower proportions of 
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one-person households and the lower rates of rental vacancies in Alameda County 
compared to NYC may account for doubling up as a risk factor for homelessness (see 
Table 1). Being a leaseholder, which was negatively correlated with doubling up with 
another household, was protective for families in NYC. The biggest contextual difference 
is the rate at which families enter shelter in NYC (12.8%) compared to the rate of literal 
homelessness in Alameda County (2.2%), although the time periods differed. This 
difference may have to do with the right to shelter in NYC and the fact that most shelters 
are apartment style. Both Alameda County and NYC are located in more difficult housing 
markets than the U.S. at large. Possibly in more benign housing markets, individual 
factors might matter more (Burt, 1991).    
Risk factors for the two broadest outcomes of homelessness differed from the 
models that predicted literal homelessness or shelter entry. This similarity is likely driven 
by the fact that 63% of the group that had any housing instability overlapped with the 
threatened homelessness group.  Both risk models included multiple indicators of poverty 
that were associated with unstable housing. These variables included part-time 
employment, earning less than 30% AMI, rents higher than 40% of income, and 
outstanding debt in excess of $1000. Additionally, being evicted from public housing was 
a reliable predictor of threatened homelessness. Notably, previous shelter did not reliably 
predict broader definitions of homelessness. For the Alameda County models, no 
significant risk factors for homelessness originated from the following domains: 
demographic variables, disability/criminal justice, and interpersonal discord. Perhaps the 
European style typology of homelessness would be useful to distinguish outcomes of 
housing instability (FEANTSA, 2005).  
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The most efficient models were those that investigated predictions of literal 
homelessness or shelter entry, regardless of location in Alameda County or NYC. Many 
communities that took part in HPRP, including Alameda County, adopted a triage 
approach - providing services to households whose risk was considered intermediate and 
were encouraged by the Department of Housing and Urban Development to do so. The 
current study suggests that triage is not justified; rather, for literal homelessness, services 
make the most difference if given to households at highest risk. For broader outcomes, 
prevention seemed to help regardless of risk level. Literal homelessness is the most costly 
outcome both for people entering shelter as well as the public. Accordingly if resources 
are limited, it might make sense to focus on people at highest risk of homelessness, but 
services remain useful to diminish housing instability for a broader range of people. One 
important caveat is that this conclusion and all others apply only to people who apply for 
prevention services. Many people who experience homelessness do not apply for 
services, and strategies to expand applications might change conclusions.  
 This study was limited in several ways. First, the broader measures of 
homelessness in Alameda County required applicants who had previously applied for 
prevention services to return to service providers or to call an emergency assistance line 
to report such outcomes.  This limitation would result in the underreporting of 
homelessness, since some people would fail to return to service providers. Accordingly, 
individuals who fail to report outcomes are counted as not experiencing it in targeting 
models, and the extent of housing instability might remain undetected. The current study 
suggests that HMIS systems should be as integrated as possible and should collect 
information systematically on broader definitions of homelessness, perhaps following the 
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European typology (FEANTSA, 2005). A second limitation is the short length of follow 
up for the Alameda County models. This limitation would also lead to underreported 
outcomes. In NYC, all participants were followed in administrative records for at least 
two years (three years for families) after applying for services. On the other hand, some 
participants in Alameda County were followed for only three months after applying for 
services. However, the limitation seems slightly less problematic given the fact that the 
highest risk for experiencing instability outcomes was shortly after applying for services. 
Finally, the sample in Alameda was not large enough to distinguish reliably between 
models for individuals and families given the small number of people who became 
homeless in the short follow-up period, but differences by household type should be 
explored where power is adequate to do so.  
Empirical targeting models can direct services where they are most useful, 
particularly in the case of literal homelessness. Targeting models are not a panacea – a 
majority of those at highest risk avoid the unwanted outcome. Nevertheless, empirical 
models are useful in identifying relative risk. This is consistent with longstanding 
literature that supports empirical targeting models in multiple domains (Ægisdóttir et al., 
2006; Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Grove et al., 2000).  
Context mattered less than was expected. The similarities across sites and 
populations suggest that it may be possible to develop a generic targeting model that is 
broadly useful. More research is needed in more sites – particularly those with more 
benign housing markets – to test the generality of the model. The risk factors that were 
important in any of the three analyses would be an excellent starting point, along with 
any additional variables that seem appropriate locally. By testing and employing 
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empirical targeting models, localities will almost assuredly improve the efficiency of 
their prevention programs and provide important information for other sites as well. 
Accordingly, the limited resources that support homelessness prevention could be better 
targeted where they are most needed – to individuals and families who would otherwise 
become homeless. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
PREVENTING HOMELESSNESS IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CA: A 
REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN  
  
Introduction 
As the US began to experience the negative effects of the recent recession, 
worries mounted that homelessness rates would increase, especially for families (Sard, 
2009). To prevent homelessness rates from rising, the Obama administration initiated the 
$1.5 billion Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing Program (HPRP) (Witte, 
2012). HPRP was intended to prevent homelessness by stabilizing households. HPRP 
provided short-term housing subsidies and modest social services to people at risk for 
homelessness or those who had recently become homeless. Subsidies lasted up to a 
maximum of eighteen months, with quarterly determinations of eligibility for continued 
assistance. These subsidies were typically not as “deep” as more permanent Housing 
Choice Vouchers, which pay the difference between 30% of income and the Fair Market 
Rent. Instead, HPRP permitted subsidies that were “shallow” (of lessor value, temporary, 
or declining in value over time). The current study examines how well HPRP worked to 
reduce homelessness rates for applicants for services in Alameda County, California.  
Most people who experience homelessness do so once for a brief time period, 
with the average length of stay in shelters varying across cities (Culhane, Metraux, & 
Byrne, 2011). Thus, it is plausible that a short-term subsidy to stabilize people would be 
sufficient to end homelessness for many. Rigorous evaluations of HPRP programs could 
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show whether this is the case. However, findings that most people who received HPRP 
stayed out of shelter fail to provide sufficient evidence that the program is successful. 
The fact that most people also avoid shelter re-entry in the absence of specialized services 
underlines the importance of counterfactuals showing what would have happened in the 
absence of the program. The current study attempts to uncover the effectiveness of HPRP 
with a regression discontinuity design (RDD).  
Policy Context of HPRP 
As a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, HUD rolled 
out the Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing Program (HPRP) with 
allocations based on the formula for the Emergency Shelter Grants Program. HPRP had 
four requirements. First, an introductory consultation with applicants was required to 
determine eligibility for services. Second, households were required to have an income 
level at or below 50% area median income (AMI). Third, households were required to be 
either homeless or at risk for losing their housing. Finally, applicants were required to be 
recertified at least once every three months to reassess eligibility (U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, 2011). 
HPRP regulations explicitly stated that the program was intended for people who 
would become homeless “but for” prevention services. Such “but for” criteria included a 
lack of housing options, insufficient money to obtain housing or remain stably housed, 
and inadequate support networks to sustain stable housing. The United States Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) stated that the assessment of these three 
criteria is “relatively easy” (2011). Further, HUD provided some suggested risk factors 
for homelessness (e.g., mental health and substance abuse histories, significant medical 
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debt), but did not provide methods to uncover locally relevant risk factors so that service 
providers might know which households were at greatest risk for homelessness.  
In addition to the somewhat vague instructions for risk determination, HPRP had 
potentially contradictory goals of service provision. The “but for” criterion encouraged 
service providers to target people at high risk for homelessness. However, HPRP’s 
second goal, that services should be capable of preventing homelessness, encouraged 
service providers to target people with fewer risk factors. Accordingly, many 
communities, including Alameda County, adopted a triage approach, providing services 
to households whose risk was deemed neither too high nor too low (see Figure 4.1). In 
cases like this, in which assignment to treatment is based on an individual’s score, a 
regression discontinuity design can be an appropriate method to determine a treatment’s 
effectiveness.  
Figure 4.1. Eligibility for Services Based on Continuum of Housing Stability (Triage) 
 
Existing HPRP investigations are limited, because no investigations of HPRP 
included a counterfactual. The current study addresses the limitation. It uses a regression 
discontinuity design to compare applicants who received homelessness prevention in 
Alameda County with those who did not. Although rigorous investigations of HPRP were 
not found in the literature, the current study builds on previous evidence of effectiveness 
from deep and shallow housing subsidies. 
Low Middle High 
Cut-off scores 
Ineligible 
Eligible 
  capable “but for” 
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Deep and Shallow Subsidies  
The current section reviews literature on evaluations of housing subsidies as a 
base from which to examine whether the shallow subsidies of HPRP helped people to 
sustain housing. Housing subsidies are one of the most commonly evaluated 
homelessness prevention strategies. Accordingly, it is not surprising that 93% of mayors 
in many of the nation’s largest cities identified mainstream housing subsidies (e.g., 
Housing Choice Vouchers) as their primary homelessness prevention strategy moving 
forward (US Conference of Mayors, 2011).  
Studies suggest that deep housing subsidies, typically Housing Choice Vouchers, 
reduce rates of homelessness. The most compelling evidence that deep subsidies reduce 
housing instability came from an experiment on the effects of housing vouchers for 
families (n = 8,731) who qualified for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
in six sites: Atlanta, GA, Augusta, ME, Fresno, CA Houston, TX Los Angeles, CA, and 
Spokane, WA (Wood et al., 2008). Results from a treatment on the treated analysis 
indicated that 9% of the treatment group lacked their own housing (i.e., lived on the 
streets or in a shelter, or doubled up with friends or families) in the fourth year of the 
five-year study, as compared with 45% of the control group. The Housing Voucher 
Evaluation provided strong evidence that vouchers offered multiple benefits to families, 
including improved housing stability. Khadduri (2008) reviewed studies of family 
homelessness and concluded that across studies, vouchers reduced rates of family 
homelessness effectively. She argued that policy makers should increase the number of 
vouchers offered, as this would be the most effective means of reducing rates of family 
homelessness.  
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An important policy question is whether HPRP works close to as well as deeper 
subsidies. HPRP, with shorter terms and shallower subsidies, is much less expensive than 
most deep subsidies. Although not associated with HPRP, one study compared recipients 
of shallow subsidies to those who did not receive such assistance. Dasinger and 
Speiglman (2007) used a survival analysis to model subsequent homelessness for 
participants in Project Independence (PI), a program for low-income individuals with 
HIV in Alameda County, CA. The impressive findings reflected a 99% rate of stable 
housing for PI participants in contrast to a 32% rate for the comparison group after one 
year. Furthermore, 96% of PI participants were stably housed after two years compared 
with 10% of the comparison group. Similar studies should be conducted in other cities 
with different populations.   
In previous homelessness studies that investigated risk for shelter entry (Chapter 
2; Shinn et al., 2013), family and individual applicants entered shelter at higher rates if 
they were at heightened risk for homelessness and ineligible for prevention services 
compared to those who received services. Applicants who were at lowest risk for 
homelessness did not enter shelter at differential rates across eligibility status. These 
findings from previous studies inform my hypotheses that 1) homelessness prevention 
services will be associated with decreased homelessness rates for applicants with low 
housing stability at the time of application, and 2) rates of housing outcomes will not 
differ across treatment or comparison status for applicants with high stability. To 
examine the effectiveness of HPRP, the current study will compare results from a 
treatment group to a counterfactual. 
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Regression Discontinuity  
The goal of the current study is to estimate homelessness outcomes for people 
who participated in HPRP relative to outcomes without the program, holding all else 
equal. For quantitative evaluations, a program’s effect is evidenced by the difference in 
the outcome for these two groups, where outcomes in the group that does not receive the 
treatment form a counterfactual. Random assignment would estimate this difference 
directly. Randomized-Controlled Trials (RCTs) assign individuals randomly to treatment 
or control groups with the goal of producing unbiased estimates of program effectiveness. 
Random assignment minimizes the selection bias that might otherwise arise from 
unaccounted for differences when alternative placement strategies are used. For RCTs 
with sufficient sample sizes, the differences in the groups post treatment are likely 
attributable to the effectiveness of the intervention because random assignment equates 
groups in expectation, on all characteristics. RCTs are widely accepted as the “gold 
standard” to detect program effects between treatment and control groups (Rossi, Lipsey 
& Freeman, 2004).  
Due to the challenges and ethical considerations inherent in RCTs, only a few 
homelessness prevention programs have evidence of effectiveness resulting from random 
assignment. For those studies that have used random assignment, treatment is often the 
random assignment to a housing intervention such as the receipt of housing vouchers 
(Tsai, Kasprow, and Rosenheck, 2011; Wood, Turnham & Mills, 2008), homelessness 
prevention (Rolston, Geyer, & Locke, 2013), or supportive housing for homeless 
individuals with a history of mental illness (Tsemberis, Gulcur, & Nakae, 2004). Control 
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groups typically receive treatment as usual, and the differences in outcomes (e.g., 
avoiding homelessness) are attributable to the effect of the treatment. 
Multiple quasi-experimental strategies (i.e., where similar treatment and 
comparison groups are formed by some process other than random assignment) have 
been suggested to uncover prevention effectiveness. Such strategies do not have the same 
ethical dilemmas as random assignment, but the lack of random assignment can introduce 
selection bias, (i.e., biased results from selection strategies that do not eliminate 
differences between the treatment and non-treatment groups before the start of the 
experiment) (Bloom, Michalopoulos & Hill, 2005; Rossi, Lipsey & Freeman, 2004). 
Although the results from quasi-experimental designs may be biased, such designs often 
permit researchers to avoid unethical research practices and to investigate program 
effectiveness in useful ways (Cook & Campbell, 1979).  
In RDD, assignment to treatment is based on the value of an observed covariate 
(e.g., stability score) on either side of a fixed cut-off score (Cook & Campbell, 1979; 
Rossi et al., 2004).  Due to the fact that individuals immediately on either side of a cut-off 
score typically share many of the same attributes (so much so that they are nearly 
identical), differences in outcomes can be attributed to program effectiveness. More than 
one cutoff score is possible, if some are deemed at such low risk that they do not need 
treatment and others are deemed at such high risk that treatment will make little 
difference – this is the classic triage model, where resources are devoted to those in the 
middle for whom they are expected to make the most difference.  
The regression discontinuity approach can produce the least biased estimates of 
the quasi-experimental designs, and it is sometimes considered the best alternative to the 
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“gold-standard” approach of random assignment (Rossi, Lipsey & Freeman, 2004). 
Imprecise control over assignment resembles randomization close to the cut-off score 
(i.e., local randomization) (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). RDD is most similar to 
randomization close to the cut-off score (or scores) and less similar at extreme scores, 
where chance plays a lower role in treatment assignment (Cook, 2008). If individuals on 
two sides of a cut-off score are different because of precise self-selection into treatment, 
the assumptions of RDD do not hold (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). Accordingly, individuals 
should not have the ability to precisely manipulate their scores on a measure so that they 
do or do not receive treatment.  
Historically, RDD has taken two basic forms: the parametric and the 
nonparametric models. The assumption of the parametric model is that one regression 
model accounts for the pretreatment association between the score variable and the 
outcome throughout the range of the data (Schochet, 2009). Alternatively, the non-
parametric assumption is more flexible (Lee & Munk, 2008) and involves local linear 
regressions on either side of the cutoff(s) (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). In RDD, there is a 
tension between obtaining a high enough sample size for adequate power and 
misspecifying the model by including individuals who scored far away from the cut-off 
score. The current paper uses both parametric and non-parametric RDD as recommended 
by Imbens and Lemieux (2008).  
There are two primary RDD methods, based on how strictly treatment assignment 
depends on the covariate (c.f., Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). The sharp regression 
discontinuity (SRD) corresponds to the absolute dependence of treatment on a sharp 
cutoff on the covariate that determines eligibility (e.g., stability score). In a fuzzy 
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regression discontinuity (FRD), there is a shift in mean probability of treatment 
assignment at the cutoff(s) as opposed to the strict shift (from 0 to 1 or vice versa) of 
probability of assignment to treatment in the SRD. The current research paper uses a 
FRD design to examine the effectiveness of HPRP to increase housing stability in 
Alameda County, CA. Not only is the current study one of the first investigations of 
HPRP, but also it is the first known investigation of a triage approach to homelessness 
prevention. Specifically, the current study contributes to previous knowledge by 
answering the question: Did HPRP in Alameda County, CA, decrease rates of housing 
instability for applicants who received services?  
Data 
This section describes the data for the current study. The sample included 2,761 
applicants for the Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing Program (HPRP) at 
participating community-development agencies in Alameda County, CA. Applicants who 
received an intake survey between October 21, 2009 and April 28, 2012 are included in 
the analyses. One limitation of the intake survey is that the countywide implementation of 
the intake survey was inconsistent in some places. Some providers likely withheld the 
survey from applicants whom providers considered poor candidates for HPRP. Because 
HPRP was one of the most substantial services available, individuals who failed to 
receive services because of a lack of income were unlikely to receive deeper subsidies 
elsewhere. 
For consistency with Alameda County’s implementation of the HPRP program, 
the current paper discusses housing stability, as opposed to homelessness risk. Here, 
housing stability is defined as the inverse of homelessness risk, according to scores on the 
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County’s intake survey. Those with low housing stability scores did not receive services 
because they were presumed to have so few resources that services would be ineffective 
to help them avoid homelessness. Instead, most of those with low housing stability scores 
were referred to other programs. Those with high housing stability scores did not receive 
services, because they were presumed able to avoid homelessness on their own. Those 
with intermediate scores received services. 
Outcome Variables 
Unlike investigations of homelessness that consider shelter entry as the sole 
homelessness outcome (Barnett et al., 2011; Chapter 2; Shinn et al., 1998; 2013), the 
current study includes multiple housing outcomes: 1) literal homelessness, 2) literal 
homelessness or imminent housing loss (hereafter referred to as threatened 
homelessness), and 3) literal homelessness, imminent housing loss, or unstable housing 
(hereafter referred to as any housing instability), as recorded in Alameda County’s 
Homelessness Management Information System (HMIS). In the years leading up to 
HPRP’s nationwide implementation, HMIS databases expanded to include most 
metropolitan areas, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development incentivized 
comprehensive data collection (Gutierrez & Friedman, 2005). Alameda County’s HMIS 
system included three outcomes of homelessness:  
Literal homelessness (according to HUD’s definition):  
• In a shelter, transitional housing, or in a place not meant for habitation  
• Escaping a domestic violence situation  
• Just exited jail, substance abuse treatment, hospital, psychiatric facility, or 
foster care setting from shelter or the streets 
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Imminent housing loss: 
• Being evicted, discharged, or otherwise notified of imminent housing loss 
Unstable housing: 
• Doubled up, being evicted from public or assisted housing 
The degree to which measures captured instances of each outcome is considered in the 
discussion. 
Covariates 
The current subsection describes covariates that were collected at the time of 
application. Intake workers computed a stability score – the primary covariate – from a 
set of housing stability subscales. Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the subscales and 
variables that intake workers used to create the overall stability score. The subscales 
were: employment and income potential, financial status, as well as housing and legal. 
Further, table 4.1 includes additional baseline covariates and outcomes participants 
experienced after applying for services. If the assumptions of RD hold, people 
immediately on either side of a cut point should have nearly identical characteristics. 
Thus control variables should not differ significantly across cut points. I estimate models 
with and without the set of covariates.  
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics for Outcomes, Baseline Covariates Included in the 
Stability Score, and Additional Covariates (n = 2761) 
Variables  Percent or Mean 
Subsequent Outcome Variables  
Literal Homelessness 2.1 
Homelessness or Imminent Housing Loss  8.9 
Any Housing Instability 14.1 
Baseline Covariates  
Employment and Income Potential   
Employed Part-Time 17.9 
Unemployed 53.1 
High school Diploma 78.3 
Receiving Public Benefits 67.1 
Financial Status  
<30% AMI 82.8 
Rent > 40% Income 82.9 
Outstanding Debt > $1000 39.7 
Housing and Legal  
Eviction History 13.1 
Being Evicted from Public Housing 7.5 
Leaseholder History 79.1 
Homeless >once last year 20.3 
Previously Homeless (Self Report) 31.6 
Previously Homeless (HMIS Record) 15.0 
Previous Night Homeless (Self Report) 21.0 
Criminal Justice History 16.6 
Additional Covariates  
Female 73.2 
African American 68.2 
Hispanic 15.5 
Age (mean) 39.3 
Veteran 6.1 
Married 12.8 
Pregnant 3.8 
Escaping Domestic Violence Currently 6.4 
Domestic Violence History 30.6 
Living Doubled up 17.8 
Disabled 38.4 
Unhealthy Compared to Peers 26.8 
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Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) - Graphical Representations 
Following recommendations from the literature (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Jacob, 
Zhu, Somers, & Bloom, 2012), the current study examines plots of 1) the probability of 
receiving treatment as a function of the scoring variable to investigate shifts in 
probability around the cutoffs, 2) the covariates as a function of the scoring variable to 
illustrate whether there are unexpected jumps in covariates around the cut-off scores, 3) 
the density of the rating variable to show the proportion of individuals who received 
particular scores, and 4) the outcomes as a function of the scoring variable to investigate 
preliminary evidence of a treatment effect at the cut-off score.  
1. Graphs of probability of receiving treatment as a function of the rating 
variable (to assess sharp vs. fuzzy discontinuities). The graph of the probability of 
receiving treatment shows how rates of treatment receipt differed on either side of the 
cutoffs in the stability scores at time of application. As described in the introduction, 
absolute shifts in the probability of treatment receipt on either side of a cutoff (i.e., 
probability shifts from 0 to 1) correspond to a sharp regression discontinuity (SRD). 
Alternatively, if there is a significant shift in probability on either side of a cutoff, but the 
shift fails to be absolute, a fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) is appropriate. A FRD 
permits some control group members to receive treatment and some treatment group 
members to fail to take up treatment.  
For the current study, two factors suggest that the discontinuities in the 
probability of treatment are not sharp. First, intake workers could override assignment to 
treatment. That is to say, intake workers could offer applicants treatment if they scored 
outside of the eligibility cutoffs. Second, applicants who received scores within the range 
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of eligibility sometimes failed to take up treatment. To the extent that intake workers 
altered scores to precisely control assignment to treatment, RDD will be invalid (Lee & 
Lemieux, 2010). However, scores on the scoring variable did not appear to be 
systematically manipulated to shift individuals into or out of eligibility, especially around 
the lower stability cutoff (described further in Figure 4.3).  
Figure 4.2 shows the rate of treatment for individuals for each discrete stability 
score. The dashed lines signify the cut-off scores, and the size of each point is weighted 
by the sample size for each score. The triage approach is clearly apparent in this graph.  
Rates of treatment were highest for those between the cutoffs and much lower 
immediately on the other sides of the cut-off scores. This graph suggests that an FRD 
approach is the appropriate choice for analysis: although there was a shift in the rate of 
treatment receipt across the cut-off scores, the shift was not an absolute change. 
Specifically, the current study describes a type II FRD (Jacob, Zhu, Somers, & Bloom, 
2012) where some members who are assigned to the treatment group do not actually 
receive treatment (i.e., no-shows) and some members who are assigned to the comparison 
group receive treatment (i.e., crossovers) (Battistin & Retorre, 2008). 
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Figure 4.2. Rate of Treatment Receipt by Stability Score (with Frequency Weights) 
    
 
 
2. Relationships of covariates & rating variable (to assess internal validity). 
Each covariate was inspected for evidence of a jump around the cut-off scores. If the 
visual representation suggests a discontinuity at the cutoff for a covariate, then 
differences between individuals on either side might not resemble random assignment, 
and the assumptions of RDD would fail to be met. If a discontinuity occurs at the cutoff 
for a particular covariate, then applicants on the two sides of the cutoff would differ on 
that factor. Accordingly, differences in the outcome would no longer be solely 
attributable to treatment. In addition to graphical analyses, covariates were tested 
statistically for discontinuities similar to tests for the outcomes. In the current study, most 
graphs and all analyses lacked evidence of a discontinuity for covariates.21  
3. Density of the rating variable (to assess manipulation of treatment). The 
systematic manipulation of scores to include or exclude individuals from treatment can 
                                                
21 Due to the large number of potential covariates, a table of estimates that shows no 
evidence for discontinuities is presented in the appendix. 
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undermine the validity of RDD (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). Accordingly, a distribution of 
the rating variable’s density should not contain drastic shifts on either side of the cutoffs. 
In the current study, the density of the rating variable (Figure 4.3) shows how smoothly 
the rates of scores transition across cutoff scores. Here, the higher cutoff score – the one 
corresponding to higher housing stability – appears to be somewhat problematic (i.e., 
scores seem to be gathered on the side of the cutoff that favors treatment). Consequently, 
evidence of manipulation seems more likely for the group that would have fallen to the 
right of the upper stability cutoff score (but who might have received lower stability 
scores to enable treatment) than for the group that fell to the left of the lower stability 
cutoff score. Further, the sample sizes are small for the group that fell above the higher 
stability cutoff score. Thus I am less confident in results from the discontinuity around 
the higher cutoff score than those around the lower cutoff score.  
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Figure 4.3. Density of Stability Score Overlaid with Normal Distribution (continuous 
curve) and Kernel Density Plot22(dashed curve) 
 
 
4. Graph plotting the relationship between the outcomes and rating variable 
(to visualize the magnitude of the impact). The graphs of outcomes as a function of 
stability score provide initial evidence of a discontinuity of the outcomes around the 
cutoff score. If the lines appear to be discontinuous at the cutoff, more sophisticated RDD 
investigations are then used to estimate treatment effects. Two graphs are presented for 
discontinuities around the lower stability cutoff score for each outcome to show the 
clearest visual representations of the data, while still allowing readers to examine 
possible differences at the cutoff scores. The first graph for each outcome takes into 
account 80% of the observations around the lower cutoff, with the most extreme 20% 
excluded. The second graph focuses on the closest 50% of observations around the cutoff 
                                                
22 A Kernel Density Plot is a non-parametric tool often used to show how well the data fit 
a normal distribution. For continuous variables, Kernel density estimates converge faster 
to the true underlying density than bins in a histogram (for more information, see: Scott, 
1979).  
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score, with the most extreme 50% excluded. Following the graphs that correspond to low 
housing stability scores, two graphs around the cutoff score that corresponded to high 
housing stability are presented for each outcome. I use Lowess smoothers23 to fit a curve 
through the data points. As a reminder, the outcomes were: 1) literal homelessness, 2) 
threatened homelessness, and 3) any housing instability.  
Figures 4.4 through 4.9 provide initial visual evidence of discontinuities in the 
rates of unstable housing outcomes at the cutoff scores of applicants with low housing 
stability scores. Each dot represents the average rate of an outcome for applicants for 
each stability score. The solid lines are Lowess curves for applicants that were less likely 
to receive treatment (i.e., their housing stability scores at baseline were too low and fell 
below the cutoff). Dashed lines represent Lowess curves for applicants that were more 
likely to receive services (i.e., they fell above the cutoff score). The vertical line 
represents the cutoff score. The graphs indicate the possibility of discontinuities, with 
curves that mostly suggest higher rates of subsequent unstable housing for those that 
were less likely to receive treatment compared to those that were more likely to receive 
treatment. This difference is especially apparent near the cutoffs, which is the area of 
interest for regression discontinuity designs.24  Note that the scale of the ordinate varies 
across graphs, depending on the range of the data. 
 
                                                
23 Lowess (Locally weighted scatter plot smoothing) is a non-parametric regression 
method that fits a smooth curve to the data via simple – yet computationally intensive – 
local models (for more information, see: Cleveland, 1979).  
24 Lowess curves are most influenced by nearby scores, but more distant scores still affect 
the overall shape of the curves. Accordingly the shape of the curve closest to the cutoff 
differs when I consider 80% of the data compared to 50% of the data.  
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Figure 4.4. Outcomes Around Lower 
Stability Score Cutoff: Rates of Literal 
Homelessness (80% of data)
  
Figure 4.5. Outcomes Around Lower 
Stability Score Cutoff: Rates of Literal 
Homelessness (50% of data)
Figure 4.6. Outcomes Around Lower 
Stability Score Cutoff: Rates of 
Threatened Homelessness (80% of data)
 
 
Figure 4.7. Outcomes Around Lower 
Stability Score Cutoff: Rates of 
Threatened Homelessness (50% of data)
Figure 4.8. Outcomes Around Lower 
Stability Score Cutoff: Rates of Any 
Housing Instability (80% of data)  
 
Figure 4.9. Outcomes Around Lower 
Stability Score Cutoff: Rates of Any 
Housing Instability (50% of data) 
  
1 9 9 7 14 11 19
17
14
24
19
26
34
50
38
39
50
62
74
94
73
81
86
93
88
105
88
116
101
100
97
105
94
84
106
Services Less Likely Services More Likely
0
.0
25
.0
5
.0
75
.1
-15 180
Centered Stability Score
Actual Homelessness Rate Lower Stability (Lowess Smooth)
Higher Stability (Lowess Smooth)
17
14
24
19
26
34
50
38
39
50
62
74
94
73
81
86
93
88
105
88
116
Services Less Likely Services More Likely
0
.0
25
.0
5
.0
75
.1
-10 -5 0 5 10
Centered Stability Score
Actual Homelessness Rate Lower Stability (Lowess Smooth)
Higher Stability (Lowess Smooth)
1
9 9
7 14 11
19
17
14
24
19
26
34
50
38
39
50
62
74
94
73
81
86
93
88
105
88
116
101
100
97
105
94
84
106
Services Less Likely Services More Likely
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
-15 180
Centered Stability Score
Threatened Homelessness Lower Stability
Higher Stability
17
14
24
19
26
34
50
38
39
50
62
74
94
73
81
86
93
88
105
88
116
Services Less Likely Services More Likely
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
-10 -5 0 5 10
Centered Stability Score
Threatened Homelessness Lower Stability
Higher Stability
9
9
7
14
11
19
17
14
24
19
26
34
50
38
39
50
62
74
94
73
81
86
93
88
105
88
116
101
100
97
105
94
84
106
Services Less Likely Services More Likely
0
.1
.2
.3
-15 180
Centered Stability Score
Any Housing Instability Lower Stability
Higher Stability
17
14
24
19
26
34
50
38
39
50
62
74
94
73
81
86
93
88
105
88
116
Services Less Likely Services More Likely
0
.1
.2
.3
-10 -5 0 5 10
Centered Stability Score
Any Housing Instability Lower Stability
Higher Stability
   
 
 
110 
On the other hand, Figures 4.10 through 4.15 appear less suggestive of 
discontinuities in the rates of unstable housing outcomes at the cutoff scores of applicants 
with higher housing stability scores. The solid lines in Figures 4.10 through 4.15 
represent applicants who were less likely to receive treatment (in this case, they were 
deemed too stable and fell above the cutoff score). The dashed lines represent applicants 
who were more likely to receive services (they fell below the cutoff score).  
The findings for applicants with higher housing stability scores are less supportive 
of an effect of treatment than for those with lower scores. Unexpectedly, rates of unstable 
housing were lower for applicants immediately to the right of the cutoff score (who were 
less likely to receive treatment) compared to those just on the left. As scores extend 
further away from the cutoff score, rates of unstable housing for those to the right of the 
cutoff score rose briefly, before declining sharply. Further, sample sizes above the upper 
cutoff were small (n = 98), leading to sharp changes in average outcome when, in reality, 
few individuals experienced such outcomes.  
Figure 4.10. Outcomes Around Higher 
Stability Score Cutoff: Rates of Literal 
Homelessness (80% of data)
  
 
Figure 4.11. Outcomes Around Higher 
Stability Score Cutoff: Rates of Literal 
Homelessness (50% of data) 
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Figure 4.12. Outcomes Around Higher 
Stability Score Cutoff: Rates of 
Threatened Homelessness (80% of data) 
  
Figure 4.13. Outcomes Around Higher 
Stability Score Cutoff: Rates of 
Threatened Homelessness (50% of data)
Figure 4.14. Outcomes Around Higher 
Stability Score Cutoff: Rates of Any 
Housing Instability (80% of data)
  
 
Figure 4.15. Outcomes Around Higher 
Stability Score Cutoff: Rates of Any 
Housing Instability (50% of data)
 
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) - Analysis 
As stated in the introduction, the current chapter uses a combination of parametric 
and non-parametric FRD to examine the effectiveness of HPRP to reduce rates of 
homelessness in Alameda County, CA (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). To estimate the 
effectiveness of treatment, some methodological issues should be addressed. First, the 
goal of carrying out the FRD is to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of treatment 
for individuals who received treatment. However, the figures showing outcomes around 
the cutoff scores show visualizations for those who were intended to be treated, without 
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consideration of whether or not they actually received treatment.  As Figure 4.2 showed, 
many applicants in the comparison group received treatment even though they scored into 
the comparison side of the cutoff. Conversely, some applicants failed to take up treatment 
when they were assigned to the treatment group.  Simply comparing groups who did and 
did not receive HPRP thus confounds the causal effect of treatment with the effects of 
whatever factors in addition to the instability score influenced whether applicants 
received treatment. The Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) – or the causal effect of 
treatment – can be retrieved using an instrumental variable approach (Jacob, Zhu, 
Somers, & Bloom, 2012).  
The FRD is estimated with an instrumental variable framework, using the scoring 
variable, an indicator of whether the applicant should be assigned to treatment based 
solely on the cutoff score, and an endogenous treatment variable (whether applicants 
actually received services or not). This estimation is carried out with two-stage least 
squares regression (Trochim, 1984; 2001). The FRD is calculated with the following two 
equations, borrowed from Jacob, Zhu, Somers, and Bloom (2012): 
First stage:                              𝑇! = 𝛼! + 𝛾!𝐶! + 𝑓!(𝑠!)+ 𝜖! 
Second stage:                          𝑌! = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑇! + 𝑓!(𝑠!)+ 𝜇! 
 
Where:  𝑇!= 1 if an individual receives treatment, and 0 otherwise; 𝐶! = 1 if an individual should be assigned to treatment based on the cutoff score, and 0 
otherwise; 𝑠! = centered scoring variable for each individual (the primary covariate);  𝑓!(𝑠!) = the association between the scoring variable and actual treatment receipt for an 
individual; 𝜖! = random error in the first stage; 𝑌! = the outcome for an individual; 𝑓!(𝑠!) = the association between the scoring variable and the outcome for an individual;  𝜇!= random error in the second stage. 
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The equations use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to estimate each stage. The 
predicted value of treatment (𝑇) is used in the second-stage regression to estimate the 
effect of treatment for each outcome. Stata’s ivregress command, specified for two-stage 
least squares regressions, corrects the standard errors in the second equation (Nichols, 
2007).25  
 In addition to the parametric estimation, the current study estimates non-
parametric, local linear regressions with different bandwidth choices as recommended in 
the literature (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). Using Stata’s rd command, LATEs are 
obtained using an optimal bandwidth based on the data (Imbens, & Kalyanaraman, 2012). 
The optimal bandwidth varies with each outcome, which inhibits a formal comparison 
with the parametric estimates. Additionally, to investigate the robustness of the effects 
across bandwidth choice, effects are obtained for the following percentages of the 
optimal bandwidth around each of the cut-off scores: 30, 50, 150, and 200. All models 
were estimated with and without baseline covariates and, separately, with risk scores 
from an efficiency analysis (chapter 3). The addition of these variables did little to the 
results of the RDD models substantively, although confidence intervals became slightly 
narrower compared to analyses without covariates. The analyses in the results section are 
presented without additional covariates in the models.  
 
 
                                                
25 Each of the outcomes in the current study is binary, which would normally call for a 
regression better suited for dichotomous outcomes (e.g., logit, probit). However, for two-
stage least squares analyses, linear regressions achieve consistent estimates of the average 
effect of treatment, even for binary outcomes (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Nichols, 2011). 
Thus the current study estimates a linear probability model based on the equations 
presented above.  
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Results 
The parametric two-stage least-squares analyses suggested that HPRP might have 
substantial effects on rates of some forms homelessness, but confidence bounds were 
wide, so results were at best marginally significant. Table 4.2 reports estimates of the 
effect of treatment (modeled as an instrumented variable), including the scoring variable 
(modeled as an exogenous variable). Regression discontinuity is especially focused on 
observations around the cutoff score. To examine effects as distant observations further 
from the cutoff are increasingly ignored, four models are estimated for each outcome 
around the cutoff scores. The first model includes all of the data from the lowest observed 
stability score and stops at the upper cutoff score. The second model contains 80% of 
observations around the lower cutoff score. The third model includes 50% of 
observations around the lower cutoff score. The fourth model contains 20% of 
observations around the lower cutoff score. Accordingly, the models focus increasingly 
on the cutoff score and exclude distant cases from the analyses.  
The models that include all of the data or 20% of the data represent the most 
inclusive and least inclusive parametric analyses, whereas the models that include 80% or 
50% of the data contain the same cases presented graphically in the methods section. The 
same strategy was used for the upper cutoff score, with the lower cutoff score 
representing the lower boundary of the data and the highest observed stability score as its 
upper boundary. If treatment reduced the probability of housing instability, the effects 
would be negative for both halves of Table 4.2.  
The LATE for threatened homelessness approached significance in the expected 
direction (-.31, p < .10) for the smallest sample of cases around the low stability cutoff. 
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Thus, nearly a third of applicants excluded from HPRP by their cutoff score were 
estimated to experience homelessness, compared to almost no applicants whose score led 
them to receive HPRP.    For any housing instability, the effect of treatment was nearly as 
large and again approached significance (-.29, p < .10) for 20% of cases around the low 
stability cutoff. For literal homelessness, the effect was in the expected direction around 
the low stability cutoff, and large enough to be meaningful (-.17, p < .15). For all three 
outcomes, estimated effects were largest close to the cutoff. As expected, the LATE was 
not significant around the high stability cutoff. However, estimated effects were in the 
unexpected direction. 
Table 4.2. Two-stage Least-squares Analysis: Regression Coefficients for the Local 
Average Treatment Effects of HPRP 
 Low Stability Cutoff High Stability Cutoff 
N = 2761 All 80% 50% 20% All 80% 50% 20% 
Literal Homelessness 
n =60 (2.2%)            
Treatment Instrument -.01 (.04) -.01 (.04) -.03 (.06) -.17 (.11) .00 (.03) .01 (.05) .00 (.00) .10 (.07) 
Scoring Variable .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .02 (.01) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .01 (.01) 
Homeless or 
Imminent Home Loss 
n =246 (8.9%)             
Treatment Instrument -.06 (.07) -.06 (.08) -.11 (.09) -.31 (.17)~ -.05 (.07) -.05 (.07) -.05 (.08) .19 (.13) 
Scoring Variable .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .03 (.02) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .03 (.01)~ 
Any Housing 
Instability 
n =389 (14.1%)             
Treatment Instrument -.07 (.08) -.07 (.10) -.12 (.11) -.29 (.19)~ -.03 (.08) -.05 (.09) -.05 (.10) .18 (.52) 
Scoring Variable .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .03 (.02) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .03 (.01)~ 
n is number of applicants who experienced the outcome subsequently 
SEs in parentheses  
~ significant at p < .10 
 
 In addition to the parametric investigations, the current study uses local linear 
regressions to examine additional evidence of treatment effectiveness. For the non-
parametric analysis, multiple models are fitted to the data with various bandwidths for 
each model. The rd command in Stata selects an appropriate bandwidth based on the data 
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(for a detailed explanation of bandwidth selection, see Imbens, & Kalyanaraman, 2012). 
For the FRD, a local Wald estimator represents the estimated LATE. The Wald estimator 
is a ratio of the estimated discontinuity (i.e., the estimated local mean difference) for the 
outcome divided by the estimated discontinuity of the treatment variable.  
Findings for local linear regressions are similar to those from the parametric 
analysis. The Wald estimators (i.e., LATEs) were non-significant (p < .05), but 
approached significance in the expected direction around the low stability cutoff score. 
Conversely, the Wald estimators around the high stability cutoff score were in the 
opposite direction – individuals who received treatment would have higher expected rates 
of the unwanted outcome, if the models had reached significance.  
Table 4.3 shows that the discontinuities in treatment (under the treatment column) 
were all significant in the expected direction. For example, the difference in the estimated 
average rate of treatment was .42 for applicants immediately on the right side of the low 
stability cutoff score compared to applicants immediately on the left for the optimal 
bandwidth associated with Literal Homelessness (in this case, 2.3 points on the stability 
scale). The differences in estimated effects of treatment varied across outcomes, because 
different optimal bandwidths were selected for each outcome (see graphs 16 through 21 
for exact optimal bandwidth values across outcomes). The best estimates of effects at the 
optimal bandwidth (Wald estimates) were quite similar to those from the parametric 
analysis (-.19, -.32, -.32), but the confidence bounds were broader and no results 
approached significance. None of the discontinuities in outcomes (under the outcome 
column) were significant at p < .05. Literal homelessness approached significance (p < 
.10) around the high stability cutoff score, albeit in the unexpected direction.  
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Table 4.3. Wald Estimates (Effects of Treatment at Cutoff), Outcome Discontinuities 
(Difference in Conditional Means of Outcomes at Cutoff), and Treatment Discontinuities 
(Difference in Conditional Means of Treatment at Cutoff) of Local Linear Regression at 
Optimal Bandwidths with Standard Errors as well as 95% and 90% Confidence Intervals  
 
Low Stability Cutoff Score High Stability Cutoff Score 
N = 2761 Wald 
Estimate 
Outcome 
Discontinuity  
Treatment 
Discontinuity  
Wald 
Estimatea 
Outcome 
Discontinuity  
Treatment 
Discontinuity  
Literal 
Homelessness 
      
Coefficient -.19 (.15) -.08 (.06) .42 (.13)*** .17 (.13) -.05 (.03) ~ -.32 (.16)* 
95% CI -.48, .10 -.19, .03 .15, .68 -.09, .43 -.12, .01 -.63, -.02 
90% CI -.43, .06 -.18, .02 .21, .63 -.04, .38 -.10, .00 -.58, -.06 
Threatened 
Homelessness 
      
Coefficient -.32 (.22) -.12 (.08) .38 (.11)*** .38 (.29) -.13 (.09) -.36 (.12)** 
95% CI -.74, .10 -.28, .04 .17, .59 -.20, .94 -.31, .04 -.59, -.14 
90% CI -.68, .04 -.25, .01 .19, .56 -.10, .86 -.28, .02 -.56, -.16 
Any Housing 
Instability 
      
Coefficient -.32 (.23) -.12 (.09) .38 (.11)*** .21 (.30) -.07 (.11) -.37 (.12)** 
95% CI -.78, .13 -.30, .05 .17, .59 -.39, .81 -.29, .13 -.59, -.14 
90% CI -.70, .06 -.27, .03 .19, .56 -.28, .70 -.25, .11 -.57, -.17 
a The Wald estimates for the high-stability cutoff are positive, because the probability of experiencing the 
outcome and the probability of treatment both decline on the right side of the cutoff score. Thus the ratio of 
the two numbers yields a positive effect.  
~p<.10, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
For the local linear regressions, bandwidth choice can alter estimates and the 
literature recommends sensitivity analyses with bandwidths that are larger and smaller 
than the optimal bandwidth (Jacob, Zhu, Somers, & Bloom, 2012). Accordingly, the 
current study examines LATEs and 95% confidence intervals at the optimal bandwidth 
and narrower and wider bandwidths to examine the robustness of the effect. To visualize 
the robustness of effects across multiple bandwidth choices, graphs of the estimates, 95% 
confidence intervals, and bandwidths at 30%, 50%, 150%, and 200% of the optimal 
bandwidth appear below (Figures 4.16 to 4.21).  
Figure 4.16 shows the estimated effects of treatment for the optimal bandwidth 
(2.3 points, marked with dashed lines) along with estimates for alternative bandwidth 
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choices, above and below the optimal bandwidth. A bandwidth of 2.3 points suggests that 
a local regression is fitted and adjusted at intervals of 2.3 points along the covariate of 
interest, namely the stability score at intake. The graph shows that the LATE ranges from 
-.1 to -.2, depending on the bandwidth choice. Further, the 95% confidence intervals 
include zero, which is consistent with the lack of significance that I found from the 
parametric analysis. However the treatment effect is in the expected direction and large 
enough to be meaningful and it approaches significance (p < .10) for some of the 
narrower bandwidth choices. Figures 4.16 through 4.18 tell similar stories about the 
effectiveness of HPRP to reduce literal homelessness, threatened homelessness, and any 
housing instability – although effects fail to reach significance, they are in the expected 
direction.  
Figure 4.16. Lower Stability: Optimal Bandwidth26 of LATE for Literal Homelessness 
and 95% CIs (with sensitivity analysis for bandwidths at 30%, 50%, 150%, and 200% of 
optimal bandwidth) 
 
 
 
 
                                                
26 Red dashed lines mark the position of the optimal bandwidth (Imbens, & 
Kalyanaraman, 2012). 
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Figure 4.17. Lower Stability: Optimal Bandwidth of LATE for Threatened Homelessness 
and 95% CIs (with sensitivity analysis for bandwidths at 30%, 50%, 150%, and 200% of 
optimal bandwidth) 
 
 
Figure 4.18. Lower Stability: Optimal Bandwidth of LATE for Any Housing Instability 
and 95% CIs (with sensitivity analysis for bandwidths at 30%, 50%, 150%, and 200% of 
optimal bandwidth) 
 
 
Figures 4.19 through 4.21 show parallel estimates of the effect of HPRP around 
the cutoff score associated with high housing stability. Crossing the cutoff was associated 
with significantly lower rates of treatment as expected. However, rates of the outcome 
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were also lower across the cutoff. Thus a positive (adverse) effect of treatment would be 
suggested if the Wald estimates were significant. In other words, treatment would seem 
to be associated with higher rates of housing instability. However, these findings should 
be interpreted with some caution. The graphical analyses in the Data section suggested 
that manipulation of service provision might have occurred around the high-stability 
cutoff score (see Figure 4.3). Accordingly, the validity of findings around this cutoff 
seems questionable. 
Figure 4.19. Higher Stability: Optimal Bandwidth of LATE for Literal Homelessness 
and 95% CIs (with sensitivity analysis for bandwidths at 30%, 50%, 150%, and 200% of 
optimal bandwidth) 
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Figure 4.20. Higher Stability: Optimal Bandwidth of LATE for Threatened 
Homelessness and 95% CIs (with sensitivity analysis for bandwidths at 30%, 50%, 
150%, and 200% of optimal bandwidth) 
 
 
Figure 4.21. Higher Stability: Optimal Bandwidth of LATE for Any Housing Instability 
and 95% CIs (with sensitivity analysis for bandwidths at 30%, 50%, 150%, and 200% of 
optimal bandwidth) 
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Discussion 
 
Using regression discontinuity methods, this study found limited evidence that 
HPRP reduced homelessness rates in Alameda County, CA, in particular for applicants 
with very low housing stability (p < 0.10). The best estimate of the Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE) around the low stability cutoff is -.17 (90% CI: -.43, .06) for 
literal homelessness, -.32 (90% CI: -.68, .04) for threatened homelessness, and -.32 (90% 
CI: -.70, .06) for any housing instability. The design does not have power to rule out a 
null effect; neither does it have power to rule out a substantial effect.27 Basic graphical 
analyses suggest discontinuities that are large enough to be meaningful in all three 
outcomes around the cutoff associated with lower housing stability, but parametric and 
non-parametric RDD analysis suggests that we cannot rule out chance as the explanation. 
Further, even these effects are not robust as we include cases further and further from the 
cutoff.  While results hinted at effectiveness for the cutoff associated with lower housing 
stability, no analyses provided evidence for effectiveness around the cutoff associated 
with high housing stability. If anything, results were in the opposite direction. The 
addition of covariates or an empirical risk score from previous analyses (Chapter 3) did 
little to the results of the RDD models substantively. The stability score that Alameda 
County used to determine service receipt was not related to literal homelessness but 
minimally related to the two more inclusive measures of threatened homelessness and 
housing instability. 
The current study was limited in multiple ways. First, the limited sample size led 
to a lack of power, especially when smaller bandwidths of data were considered close to 
                                                
27 See Power Analysis in Appendix. 
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the cutoffs (Jacob et al., 2012). Power was also limited because the outcomes tended to 
be rare, especially literal homelessness (2.2% experienced the outcome).  The best 
estimates of effects were large, but we cannot rule out that they were due to chance. 
Additionally, some assumptions of RDD seem to be violated around the cutoff associated 
with higher stability. In particular there was some evidence that some applicants around 
the cutoff associated with higher stability may have received scores that pushed them 
across the threshold favoring service receipt. This finding combined with the limited 
sample size above the higher cutoff (n = 104) compared to the sample size below the 
lower cutoff (n = 337) calls the validity of results around the cutoff associated with 
higher stability into question.  
An additional limitation to this study is that the outcomes were treated as if they 
were uncensored. Given the limited follow-up time for some individuals (i.e., sometimes 
just over three months), some applicants may have become homeless after the study 
ended. However, previous studies of homelessness prevention found that applicants were 
at highest risk for homelessness soon after applying for services (Shinn et al., 2013, 
Chapter 2, Chapter 3). Nevertheless, future investigations might include longer periods of 
follow up (e.g., two or three years for all participants) so that all applicants have the same 
time period to potentially experience the outcome.  The follow-up period is certainly not 
long enough to understand whether any effects of the temporary subsidies provided by 
HPRP are temporary or permanent. 
A final limitation to this study is that some applicants failed to receive the intake 
survey when providers considered them to be poor candidates for HPRP. Reports from 
some providers suggested that applicants were not surveyed if they would have been 
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eligible for services but lacked the resources (especially income) necessary to avoid 
homelessness, even with the help of HPRP. If providers were correct that individuals 
would have been deemed eligible and would nevertheless have become homeless, the 
current study would have overestimated the effect of HPRP. Alternative assumptions 
about providers’ accuracy could suggest a bias in the opposite direction. Overall, the 
elimination of some members of the population from the sample that was surveyed 
further calls the effectiveness findings from this study into question.  
From a programmatic standpoint, findings suggest that Alameda County 
implemented HPRP without compromising the validity of the research design, at least 
around the lower-stability cutoff. For future studies, intake workers could record specific 
reasons for overriding the cutoffs. Because discontinuities in covariates failed to be 
apparent around the cutoffs, there is no evidence that intake workers granted services to 
specific groups. However, justifications from workers could improve future 
investigations, because evaluators could understand whether the scoring variable 
systematically excluded people with specific characteristics. 
Improvement in the measurement of outcomes might provide clearer research 
findings and hence firmer guidelines for policy. According to data from the Annual 
Homeless Assessment Report (AHAR, 2013), Alameda County’s HMIS captures almost 
82% of shelter beds. This percentage is higher than percentages in many other areas, but 
Alameda County might do more to ensure that all shelter beds are included in their 
counts. Such an effort might lead to more accurate rates of the literal homelessness 
outcome measured in the current study. For example, the rate of literal homelessness for 
the current study (2.2%) was much lower than the rate of shelter entry for similar 
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populations in New York City (6.4% for individuals and 12.8% for families, albeit over 
longer periods than studied here), where the HMIS includes over 91% of shelter beds. A 
fully integrated HMIS would improve estimates of subsequent homelessness. 
Measurements of the broader outcomes of threatened homelessness and any 
housing instability are also underestimates. These outcomes were recorded only if 
applicants for HPRP services (whether or not they received those services) called service 
providers again for additional assistance. Further, since applicants who received help 
might be more likely to seek additional help than those turned away initially, these 
measures could underestimate the effects of treatment. Observed effects would then be 
lower-bound estimates of actual effects. 
Although the current study fails to find conclusive evidence that HPRP reduced 
rates of homelessness, RDD is an appropriate method to evaluate how well prevention 
programs work. Future studies of similar programs with larger samples – especially 
around the chosen cutoff(s) – and longer follow-up periods would yield clearer results 
(that is results with narrower confidence bounds). This study shows that prevention 
programs, like HPRP in Alameda County, can offer services in a way that is compatible 
with RDD analysis and with limited threats to validity. This is one of the first studies in 
the homelessness prevention literature to estimate effects using RDD. By using this 
design, the study included a counterfactual, which is vital to uncover how effective a 
program might be.  
Despite the limited nature of the evidence for prevention in this study, there are 
two important implications for policy.  First, in combination with studies of targeting of 
homelessness prevention efforts in Alameda County (Chapter 3) and elsewhere (Chapter 
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2; Shinn et al. 2013), the study suggests that prevention efforts are most likely to be 
effective if targeted at high-risk individuals with low prior housing stability.  There is no 
evidence in any of these studies for widely used triage policies that exclude the highest-
risk households from receiving assistance to prevent homelessness. Entry into 
homelessness was far from certain, even for broad definitions of homelessness and for 
households with the lowest housing stability scores. 
Second, because the best estimates of the effects of HPRP were substantial, but 
poorly specified, collection of additional evidence is important. Other cities that can link 
HPRP assessments to data from Homelessness Management Information Systems could 
provide similar analyses.  Even if each sample is relatively small and results 
inconclusive, given the low likelihood of people becoming homeless over short periods 
of time, the synthesis of evidence across studies, using meta-analysis or other tools, could 
provide clearer evidence about the effectiveness of efforts to prevent homelessness.  
HPRP is a relatively inexpensive program.  If it has important effects, the policy 
implications would be enormous.  Other studies should build on the initial step taken here 
to investigate how much homelessness prevention programs can reduce or eliminate the 
high rates of homelessness that plague the U.S. 
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CHAPTER 5 
  
CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE 
 
Homelessness Prevention: Effectiveness and Efficiency 
 This dissertation expands the understanding of effectiveness and efficiency of 
homelessness prevention programs with in-depth empirical analyses in Alameda County, 
CA and New York City, NY. The findings provide limited evidence that prevention 
programs can reduce entries into homelessness, and stronger evidence that programs can 
be made to work better by focusing efforts on individuals and families at higher risk. The 
studies also contribute to our understanding of the causes of homelessness, via the 
examination of particular risk factors in the two sites.    
Empirical Risk Models Increase Efficiency Compared to Intake Worker Judgments 
of Eligibility 
Chapters 2 and 3 investigated efficiency – the extent to which services were 
targeted to those who most needed them.  Empirical models are useful in identifying 
relative risk. This is consistent with longstanding literature that supports empirical 
targeting models in multiple domains (Ægisdóttir et al., 2006; Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 
1989; Grove et al., 2000). In Alameda County, it was possible to target literal 
homelessness more efficiently than broader forms of homelessness; the two broader 
models do not differ significantly in terms of efficiency. The literal homelessness model 
for Alameda County falls between the efficiency of the two models in NYC – it is more 
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efficient than the model for families (especially at higher false alarm rates) and less 
efficient than the model for individuals (Chapter 3). 
Remarkably, risk domains for homelessness tended to be consistent across 
populations (i.e., families and individuals) and location (i.e., New York City and 
Alameda County), although some survey questions differed substantially across sites. 
Previous homelessness was the predictor with the largest association with subsequent 
homelessness for all groups (Chapter 2; 3; Shinn et al., 2013). Perhaps people are less 
likely to avoid homelessness if they have already accepted an identity of homelessness 
from a previous experience than if they have never been without a home. Or perhaps the 
risk factors that precipitated the earlier episode persisted and continued to put people at 
heightened risk.  
In addition to previous homelessness, risk factors associated with access to 
affordable housing and poverty that may be considered individual manifestations of 
structural risk were reliable predictors of subsequent homelessness across groups 
(Chapter 2; 3; Shinn et al., 2013). By way of contrast, individual vulnerabilities, such as 
mental illness, substance abuse, and domestic violence failed to be useful predictors of 
homelessness in any site, even though rates of these vulnerabilities varied across groups 
in the expected directions (Chapter 3). These findings contribute to our theoretical 
understanding of the origins of homelessness – individual vulnerabilities may operate 
through access to income and housing. Across groups, risk for homelessness was highest 
shortly after applying for services, although risk persisted for a year or more (Chapter 2; 
3; Shinn et al., 2013).  
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 Some risk factors differed, often because the programs asked different questions. 
For example, eviction was positively associated with homelessness across studies, but 
Alameda County asked applicants if they were being evicted from public housing, and 
this indicator was more reliable than simply having an eviction history (Chapter 3). 
Further, verbal eviction was more reliable than formal written eviction for individuals in 
NYC (Chapter 2).  
In the future, programs might tailor their assessment procedures to include 
reliable predictors from other sites to examine their reliability in new locations.  Findings 
across studies suggest that risk models may generalize across location (Chapter 3). This 
suggestion stems from the finding that structural causes manifesting as individual risk 
factors consistently predicted homelessness across sites (Chapter 3). Of course, risk 
models should be examined for fit with particular locations. Both communities studied 
here had lower homeownership rates, lower rates of rental vacancies, higher 
unemployment rates, and higher poverty rates than national averages (Chapter 3). As 
more locations investigate the efficiency of their targeting models, the degree to which 
models generalize across sites will become clearer.  
For the Narrowest Definitions of Homelessness, Programs Appear to Be Most 
Effective for those at Highest Risk 
 Chapter 4 investigated the effectiveness of a modest prevention program in 
Alameda County, CA, and found limited evidence of large effects. For those with low 
housing stability, homeliness prevention services were protective, but effects were not 
statistically reliable (Chapter 4). The best estimate of the Local Average Treatment Effect 
(LATE) around the low stability cutoff is -.17 (90% CI: -.43, .06) for literal 
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homelessness, -.32 (90% CI: -.68, .04) for threatened homelessness, and -.32 (90% CI: -
.70, .06) for any housing instability. The design does not have power to rule out a null 
effect; neither does it have power to rule out a substantial effect. This finding is supported 
by evidence that applicants at the highest risk of homelessness who received services 
experienced lower subsequent shelter-entry rates than those who were denied services in 
New York City, but services were not associated with lower shelter entry rates for low 
risk applicants  (Chapter 2; Shinn et al., 2013). For applicants in Alameda County, the 
outcome of literal homelessness exhibited a similar trend (Chapter 3). For those with 
lower risk (i.e., higher stability), services failed to be associated with different rates of 
subsequent homelessness – if anything, services may have led to increased rates of 
subsequent homelessness for this group (Chapter 4). However, for broader definitions of 
homelessness, providing services at any level of risk seemed to be associated with lower 
rates of these outcomes (Chapter 3).  
 One of the most substantial difficulties with investigating effectiveness is finding 
a suitable counterfactual, and Chapter 4 was the first known homelessness investigation 
to employ a regression discontinuity design (RDD). Such a design mirrors a randomized 
controlled trial around a cutoff score, and thus, includes a counterfactual. RDD studies 
are challenged with multiple threats to validity, but Alameda County did not seem to 
compromise the design, especially for those with the lowest rates of housing stability 
(Chapter 4).  
Two primary challenges to the current dissertation likely affected the lack of 
reliability for the effectiveness investigation. First, while RDD is an appropriate design to 
uncover the Local Average Treatment Effect, RDD requires much larger sample sizes 
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than randomized controlled trials, because only participants with scores close to the 
cutoff that determines receipt of services are included in analyses. With sample sizes that 
were likely too small in the current dissertation, the confidence intervals were too broad 
to lead to reliable conclusions. Second, the outcome of subsequent literal homelessness 
was rare, which increased the difficulty of finding an effect. At least some of the 
infrequency of the measured outcome was due to a homelessness management 
information system (HMIS) that failed to incorporate all shelter beds (Chapter 4) and to 
short follow-up periods for some applicants. Nevertheless, the best estimate of the effect 
of prevention on homelessness was substantial – especially for the broadest definitions of 
homelessness – so it is important to the field to get a more reliable fix on how much 
prevention helps.  Because other sites are unlikely to have much larger samples of high-
risk applicants to work with, it will be important to aggregate results across sites (see 
recommendations in the Future Research section below). For now, homelessness 
prevention in Alameda County remains promising, but unproven.  
Outcomes of prevention for broader definitions of homelessness (i.e., threatened 
homelessness and any housing instability) in Alameda County also appeared promising 
but not proven.  In addition to the difficulties already cited for measures of literal 
homelessness, the broader outcomes contained additional biases, because applicants 
could report these outcomes only by returning to providers for additional services. Thus 
rates of each outcome were likely underestimates and, to the extent that applicants who 
received services at the outset were more likely to return to ask for additional help, 
estimates of intervention effects were likely conservative (Chapter 4).    
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Policy Recommendations 
 
Empirical models are vital to efficiently offer prevention services to those at 
highest risk (Chapter 2; 3; Shinn et al., 2013). Accordingly, homelessness policy should 
support investigations of efficiency by including the guidance and funding necessary for 
rigorous evaluations. Such support should include technical assistance for local providers, 
and funding for ongoing examinations of model efficiency. Further, policy should 
emphasize the importance of sharing and integrating results across locations, and as 
evidence accumulates, offer guidelines for prevention based on the most recent and 
rigorous empirical risk models. 
The nation’s largest homelessness prevention effort, the Homelessness Prevention 
and Rapid Re-housing Program (HPRP), encouraged communities to use a triage design 
(Chapter 4), and none of the empirical investigations here support such an approach 
(Chapters 2; 3; 4). Instead, evidence from the current dissertation suggests that programs 
should focus on the highest risk applicants for subsequent shelter entry or literal 
homelessness (Chapter 2; 3). On the other hand, prevention seems to be associated with 
decreased rates of broader forms of homelessness and housing instability, regardless of 
risk level (Chapter 3). However, with no indication that prevention effectively reduced 
rates for those at low risk for homelessness (defined in all three ways) in the regression 
discontinuity chapter (Chapter 4), the apparent benefits of prevention for broader forms 
of homelessness and housing instability may not be concentrated at the high-risk end of 
the spectrum.  
Previous homelessness, a lack of affordable housing, and poverty appeared to be 
the primary risk factors across NYC and Alameda County (Chapter 2; 3) that pushed 
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people into homelessness. Each of these risk factors has ties to policy. First, people who 
experience previous homelessness appear to be at highest risk of subsequent 
homelessness across populations and location. Accordingly, policy should provide 
additional support for those with previous bouts of homelessness so that they might 
escape cycling back into the shelter system. Such supports would not only increase the 
ability of the most vulnerable people to avoid homelessness, but also save public funds 
by avoiding repeated expensive shelter stays.  
Second, a lack of affordable housing is apparent in NYC and Alameda County 
(Chapter 3), and such problems are often found in housing markets across cities. When a 
lack of affordable housing coincides with high poverty rates, the most vulnerable 
populations are left without access to suitable housing (Chapter 1). Housing vouchers and 
social welfare initiatives (e.g., TANF) are examples of policy that might be expanded or 
tailored to those at highest risk of becoming homeless. Efforts to combat both the lack of 
affordable housing and high rates of poverty would likely help to keep the most 
vulnerable people housed. In this sense, the findings of this study support the theorized 
population and high-risk framework (Apicello, 2010), where interventions would take 
place at multiple levels simultaneously. 
Prevention Recommendations 
 In contrast to macro-level policy recommendations, the current subsection 
discusses recommendations for local prevention programs. Across studies, efficiency was 
substantially improved by using empirical targeting models compared to intake worker 
determinations of eligibility for services (Chapter 2; 3). Accordingly, this dissertation 
recommends using and evaluating empirical models to target services to applicants of 
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homelessness prevention programs. Further, for cities that share ecological characteristics 
with New York and Alameda County, local prevention providers might adopt a version of 
the targeting models compared in Chapter 3. For localities with more benign housing 
markets, more research is needed to see whether risk models are transferrable (see 
discussion on future research below).  
 To examine effectiveness and efficiency in additional sites, prevention programs 
should attempt to offer services in a way that remains true to the goals of the intervention 
while allowing evaluations to be conducted. This dissertation found that Alameda County 
offered services to the majority of applicants (83%) without compromising the validity of 
a regression discontinuity design for those with the lowest housing stability according to 
the County’s rating system (Chapter 4). Other studies have also encouraged evaluation 
teams to investigate the effectiveness of their programs (e.g., HomeBase). Where 
resources are limited, a lottery (allowing a randomized control trial) is potentially a fair 
way to allocate scarce resources.  Alternatively, quasi-experimental designs, especially 
regression discontinuity designs, may be more ethically defensible and lower cost 
alternatives to randomized control trials, although they require substantially larger sample 
sizes.   
 In addition to offering services in ways that permit rigorous evaluations with 
suitable counterfactuals, programs might increase the coverage of Homelessness 
Management Information Systems and consider integrating data from multiple social 
service agencies, not just those that are part of the homeless service system (Chapter 4). 
Homelessness outcomes occur rarely, and evaluators would obtain more reliable and 
valid estimates if locations captured outcome occurrences accurately. While obtaining 
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accurate estimates of shelter use might be the first step in capturing homelessness 
outcomes, designing a HMIS to capture broader outcomes of homelessness and housing 
instability would provide additional information for individuals and families who are 
insufficiently housed but have avoided shelter entry.  
Some locations might be most interested in targeting services to those at highest 
risk of shelter entry because it is expensive. Other locations with greater access to 
resources might expand their prevention efforts to include broader definitions of 
homelessness. The current study found applicants who experienced shelter entry or literal 
homelessness shared more similarities with each other across location than with 
applicants who experienced threatened homelessness or any housing instability in the 
same location (Chapter 3). Accordingly, providers who are interested in investigating 
broader definitions of homelessness should keep in mind that risk factors may differ for 
those who experience literal homelessness compared to those with other types of 
instability.  
In general, locations that seek to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of their 
programs should encourage intake workers to collect data thoroughly. Intake workers 
may be more interested in providing services than collecting accurate data, but poor data 
quality can be detrimental to the clients that service providers seek to assist. High rates of 
missing data can lead to problems that range from complicated analyses (e.g., multiple 
imputation) to biased results. Perhaps, supervisors and managers can share results from 
other investigations with their staff to highlight what high-quality data collection might 
mean for their clients. Additionally, researchers and evaluators might interact directly 
with program staff to incentivize adequate data collection.  
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Finally, prevention programs should publicize results so that they can learn best 
practices from one another. Local prevention programs can examine the effectiveness and 
efficiency of their models, and the current dissertation and previous research suggest that 
efficiency will improve with empirical models compared to current worker decisions 
(Chapter 2; 3; Shinn et al., 2013).  
Future Research 
 Above all other findings, the current dissertation points out the need for future 
research to examine effectiveness and efficiency across locations. Effectiveness studies 
of homelessness prevention require a counterfactual to attribute differences in 
homelessness rates to treatment (Chapter 4). Future studies should strive for designs that 
include comparison groups that are similar as possible to the treatment group.  
For designs that require large sample sizes, research results that seem substantial 
but that lack the power necessary for reliability can become a part of meta-analyses of 
homelessness prevention (Chapter 4). Accordingly, evaluators should pursue rigorous 
investigations and publicize results even when they may lack the ability to detect an 
effect. Additionally, further research is needed to test the effectiveness of particular kinds 
of interventions. Neither HomeBase in New York City nor HPRP in Alameda County 
provided detailed descriptions of exactly what they did for different applicants when they 
provided prevention services. Documenting programs (and any services available to 
comparison groups) is critical to learning from study results. Further, literature reviews of 
empirical studies are needed to illustrate the current state of effectiveness investigations.  
 The efficiency findings for similarities and differences across groups in the 
current dissertation highlight exciting possibilities for future research. First, as additional 
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jurisdictions incorporate empirical risk models, researchers should examine the extent to 
which models are generalizable (Chapter 3). Such investigations should expand beyond 
urban settings with limited access to affordable housing. Instead, prevention programs in 
rural areas as well as in cities with more benign housing markets should investigate 
empirical models for generalizability to their locations. Additional investigations of 
efficiency in different cities could go far to assist researchers and service providers to 
better understand how interactions of structural causes of homelessness with individual 
vulnerabilities differ across locations.     
This dissertation begins to establish empirical evidence for the effectiveness and 
efficiency of modest prevention services. However, the findings are just a beginning, and 
they appear to leave more questions than definite answers. Although unreliable, effects of 
prevention were encouraging for those who had low housing stability. Additional studies 
and meta-analyses that combine results from multiple sites will allow researchers to 
specify the effects of prevention programs more precisely. In terms of efficiency, the 
results from studies in two housing markets with limited access to affordable housing 
suggest that structural issues are the driving forces of homelessness (Chapter 3). Future 
research is necessary to examine similarities and differences for these findings across 
housing markets.  
The importance of individual manifestations of structural factors in predicting 
homelessness lends support to the population and high-risk framework. This study, and 
others (Messeri, O’Flaherty, & Goodman, 2011; Rolston, Geyer, & Locke, 2013; Shinn et 
al., 2013) suggest that prevention programs that provide services to individuals can 
counteract structural risk. Nevertheless, prevention programs might do better not only to 
   
 
 
138 
provide immediate prevention for individuals and families but also to combat the 
structural forces that lead to high homelessness rates in the first place.  
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APPENDIX CHAPTER 2 
NOTES ON MULTIPLE IMPUTATION 
The following questions and responses are intended to provide information about 
the rationale and procedure for carrying out Multiple Imputation (MI). A detailed 
description of MI is beyond the scope of this appendix, but a thorough foundation for MI 
can be found in multiple sources (e.g., Graham et al., 2003; Rubin, 1987). 
What is Multiple Imputation? 
Multiple imputation is a technique that predicts missing values for a variable by 
using information from non-missing values across other variables (Wayman, 2003). The 
MI technique can estimate a value for each missing cell in a data set and replicates this 
method for a specified number of data sets. Multiple data sets are needed because final 
estimates should include variability to account for the uncertainty of the missing value. 
Thus, with MI, each missing cell in a data set will have multiple estimates across a 
number of imputed data sets.  
Rubin’s (1987) rules for combining datasets suggest that the intended analysis 
should be carried out on each data set, and the results should be combined across data 
sets. First, statistical programs save the estimates and standard errors for each dataset 
across analyses. Then, the estimates are averaged across datasets. However, standard 
errors must be corrected for within imputation variance as well as between imputation 
variance (for formulae, see Rubin, 1987). The resulting estimates and standard errors 
make use of all available information, rather than eliminating cases that may contain only 
one (or more) missing value across variables. As with most quantitative tools, there are 
multiple assumptions about when to properly use MI, and while the intention of this 
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appendix is not to outline all assumptions, MI has been shown to be remarkably tolerant 
to violations of assumptions and even across forms of missingness that might not be 
random (Graham, 2009; Wayman, 2003).   
Why is multiple imputation needed? 
The MI procedure has been shown to reduce bias that arises from other ways of 
dealing with missing data (e.g., list-wise deletion, mean matching, single imputation), 
especially with substantial proportions of missing data (Graham & Hofer, 2000; Schafer 
& Graham, 2002). Naïve techniques that eliminate missing data, such as list-wise 
deletion, assume that the missing cases are missing completely at random (MCAR). 
However, missingness can also arise from data that are missing at random (MAR) (i.e., 
known variables account for the missingness) and missing not at random (MNAR) (i.e., 
unknown variables account for the missingness). Thus, a blanket elimination of cases that 
are anything other than MCAR can lead to biased results when an underlying reason for 
missingness is ignored. Even when MCAR cases are lost due to list-wise deletion, 
elimination will lead to a loss of power, although results will likely be unbiased 
(Wayman, 2003).   
How many data sets should be imputed?  
 The number of data sets that one should impute remains an issue of debate, but 
much of the literature suggests that 1) more data sets yield less biased results, and 2) high 
rates of missingness call for many imputations (Graham et al., 2007). While some 
statisticians suggest that very few imputations are enough to obtain excellent results (e.g., 
Schaffer, 1999), the current study imputes 50 data sets for the analyses in Chapters 2 and 
3. 
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APPENDIX CHAPTER 3 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY FAMILY STATUS 
 Individuals  
(n = 1261) 
Families  
(n = 1500) 
 
Variables  Percent or Mean Percent or Mean  
Subsequent Outcome Variables    
Literal Homelessness 2.54 1.80  
Homeless or Imminently Losing Housing 8.96 8.93  
Any Housing Instability 13.56 14.73  
Baseline Covariates    
Demographics    
Female 58.21 85.87***  
African American 70.90 65.93**      
Hispanic 10.79 19.40***  
Age 42.97 36.15***  
Veteran 10.31 2.53***  
Married 11.42 17.13***  
Pregnant N/A 4.47  
Human Capital    
Employed Part-Time 16.97 18.73  
Unemployed 57.34 49.53***  
Receiving Non-Cash Benefits 59.64 73.47***  
<30% AMI 85.01 81.07**  
High school Diploma 82.24 75.60***  
Housing Conditions    
Leaseholder History 72.72 84.47***  
Doubled up 17.05 17.80  
Eviction History 11.10 14.93**  
Being Evicted from Public Housing 5.95 8.73**  
Rent > 40% Income 85.41 80.40**  
Outstanding Debt > $1000 35.92 42.87***  
Disability/Criminal Justice History    
Disabled 46.15 31.93***  
Unhealthy Compared to Peers 30.69 22.07***  
Criminal Justice History 19.03 14.07***  
Interpersonal Discord    
Domestic Violence History 25.30 35.47***  
Escaping Domestic Violence Currently 3.57 8.93***  
Shelter History    
Homeless >once last year 26.01 15.47***  
Previously Homeless (Self Report) 36.16 27.07***  
Previously Homeless (HMIS Record) 21.33 9.67***  
Previous Night Homeless (Self Report) 27.52 15.53***  
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 for chi-squared analyses or two-tailed t-tests across groups  
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APPENDIX CHAPTER 4 
COVARIATE DISCONTINUITIES 
Variables  Difference in 
rates of crossing 
cutoff score P-Value 
Baseline Covariates   
Employment and Income Potential    
Unemployed .01 .98 
High school Diploma .33 .48 
Receiving Non-Cash Benefits .51 .30 
Financial Status   
<30% AMI .39 .43 
Rent > 40% Income .04 .93 
Outstanding Debt > $1000 -.20 .68 
Housing and Legal   
Eviction History -.23 .44 
Leaseholder History -.05 .84 
Previously Homeless (Self Report) -.22 .57 
Previous Night Homeless (Self Report) -.36 .32 
Criminal Justice History .13 .54 
Additional Covariates   
Female .25 .56 
African American -.28 .49 
Hispanic .36 .31 
Age (mean) -6.68 .53 
Veteran -.14 .53 
Married .37 .20 
Pregnant -.12 .48 
Escaping Domestic Violence Currently .04 .56 
Domestic Violence History -.15 .75 
Living Doubled up .16 .64 
Disabled -.03 .94 
Unhealthy Compared to Peers .49 .17 
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APPENDIX CHAPTER 4 
POWER ANALYSIS 
One difficulty with the RD design is the much larger sample sizes required 
compared to the randomized controlled trial (RCT) to have enough statistical power to 
show an effect (Schochet, 2009). In fact, if the score variable were normally distributed 
with the cut-point at the center of the distribution, the sample for a RD design would have 
to be 2.75 times larger than for a RCT to have the same precision (Goldberger, 1972). 
Because of this challenge with the RD design, some researchers have focused on 
expanding the range around cut-off values to increase power (Cappelleri, Darlington, & 
Trochim, 1994).  
Lee and Munk (2008) offer the formula for determining the sample size of a 
parametric RD based on the desired minimum detectable (standardized) effect size 
(MDES), proportion of participants assigned to treatment, R2 of the model, significance 
level, and power. 
𝑛 = 1− 𝑅!! 𝑧!!! − 𝑧! !𝑀!𝑃 1− 𝑃 1− 𝑅!!      
“where M is the MDES, 𝑧!   and  𝑧!!! are normal 100α –th and 100(1-β)-th 
percentiles, respectively.” (p. 1679) 𝑅!!  is the r-squared statistic for the model. 𝑅!!  is the 
squared correlation between treatment and score variable (.09 in the current study; the 
correlation was .3 for 10 points above and below each cut point). P is the proportion of 
participants assigned to treatment (83% in the current study). A power analysis for the 
non-parametric investigation was not found in the literature. However, one study 
addresses the bandwidth size (or area of inclusion) in detail (Imbens & Kalyanaraman 
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2012). Because different sizes of bandwidths include more or fewer cases, a power 
analysis should include considerations of both sample sizes and power.  
Two meta-analyses offer anticipated effect sizes. The first meta-analysis found an 
average treatment effect of .37 (95% CI .18-.55) for community interventions across six 
randomized controlled trials with various homelessness outcomes (Coldwell & Bender, 
2007). The second study, a prospective meta-analysis of eight sites, found an average 
effect size of .22 (95% CI .09-.34) for an outcome of housing stability (Banks, McHugo, 
Williams, Drake, & Shinn, 2002). To align with the effects found in previous analyses, I 
provide a range of power analyses for effect sizes from .09-.55. 
Table 1. Sample Sizes for .8 Power 
 
R-squared: 
              MDES 
.01 .1 .2 .3 
.09 5855 5323 4731 4140 
.2 1186 1078 958 838 
.3 527 479 426 373 
.4 297 269 240 210 
.5 190 172 154 134 
.55 157 143 127 111 
Note: Sample sizes were always rounded up 
A related formula for determining power is given as: 
1− 𝛽 = 1− 𝑃 𝑍 < 𝑧!!! −𝑀 𝑛𝑃 1− 𝑃 1− 𝑅!!1− 𝑅!! . 
If I assume a sample size of 500 around each cut point, table 1 shows the power for 
variations of effect sizes and r-squared values.  
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Table 2. Power for Various R-squared Values and Effect Sizes (n = 500) 
 
R-squared: 
              MDES 
.01 .1 .2 .3 
.09 .18 .19 .20 .22 
.2 .49 .52 .56 .61 
.3 .78 .81 .85 .89 
.4 .94 .96 .97 .99 
.5 .99 1 1 1 
.55 1 1 1 1 
Note: Power is rounded to the nearest hundredth 
In the absence of a power analysis for the non-parametric RD design28, this power 
analysis for a parametric RD design provides the best approximation of power for various 
sample sizes, effect sizes, and r-squared values. To have power of .8 or higher, table 1 
shows the sample sizes necessary for differing effect sizes and r-squared values. For a 
modest to large effect size (>.2) and with a desired power of .8, the current sample size (n 
= 2,726) falls within the range required to detect an effect. However, for the smallest 
effect sizes found in homelessness literature (.09), the current sample would be too small 
to have sufficient power to detect an effect. Additionally, more and more of the sample 
will be excluded as the bandwidths of the non-parametric RD design grow narrower. 
Table 2 shows that if the sample size were held at 500 (for a somewhat large bandwidth 
around a cut point), the effect would have to be .3 or greater to be detected with a 
                                                
28 This precision estimate is for the full parametric models only. For the non-parametric 
models, current research does not offer a reliable way to estimate precision (Jacob et al., 
2012). The problem with estimating precision for non-parametric models is that 
observations around the cutoff are weighted so heavily that distant observations are often 
ignored. Thus non-parametric models are inherently less precise than parametric models.  
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minimum of .8 power. Further, if the effect were .3, the r-squared value would have to be 
larger than .01. Overall, the sample size seems sufficient to detect large effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
